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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LAURA E. STARLEY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
STEVEN D. MCDOWELL, 
l.)elcMi(.liinl/A|>pelli 
Case No. 970055-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This > •- \v; jurisdiction of this action for divorce pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
_U ) » _ /I l'i) i i : >t ) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether 1 lir1 lii.il <i1 nil ab'irsnl il1, discretion in nuking an unequal distribution 
of the parties' property. 
i.'Vli.ether the trial court, made adequate findings of fact as to whether 
1 In: | _ nl (IK; |ui'lii"i w n\ m i ni I ill in piuiiiinliil 
I I I Vlidher the trial court erred in awarding assets with a value of 
$379,811 to Ms. Starley and assets with a value oi $X< : ^42 u>\b McDowell. 
Standard of Review : ""!| 1: it ise of discr stion Di t 
1990). 
Whether the trial court made adequate findings of fact as to Mr. McDowell's 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Binzhu Riwham. ?r~ p 'V 1065 
(UtaliApp. 1994). 
III. Whether the trial court made adequate findings of fact to support its alimony 
award. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841 
(UtahApp. 1992). 
IV. Whether the trial court erred in awarding alimony to Ms. Starley for a period 
of only one year. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 
(UtahApp. 1991). 
V. Whether the trial court erred in failing to require Mr. McDowell to pay one-
half of the costs of the nanny and one-half the costs of private school for the children. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Brooks v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955 (Utah 
App. 1994). 
VI. Whether the trial court should award Ms. Starley's attorney's fees incurred in 
the appeal. 
Standard of Review: No standard of review applicable. Ordinarily when fees are 
awarded below to the party who prevails on appeal, fees will 
also be awarded to that party on appeal. Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 
489 (Utah App. 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following statutes bear on the issues of this case: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-3(1) and (2) (1995), which provides in pertinent part: 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any 
action to establish an order of custody, visitation, child support, alimony, or 
division of property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the 
costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the 
other party to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The 
order may include provision for costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, child 
support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may 
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c*vVt4xv* wosts and attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially 
prevailed upon the claim or defense. The nmr; < :,.s discretion, may award 
no fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is 
impecunious or enters in the record the reason fS- -i • * 'irdin:; fees. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1997), which provides: 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in 
it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and 
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsible ;or the payment of 
reasonable and necessary medical and r xpenses of the 
dependent children; 
(b) : coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, 
an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, 
hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
( j pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(1) an order specifying which party is responsible 
for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the 
parties contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify 
respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's division 
of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' 
separate, current addresses; and 
I  MI I i in mi 1111 iMHiiis Ini l l i i milum t i i i t i i l nl illliCM milt i 
in mi in I III 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with 
Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 
(2) I he court, may include, in ai: ordei determining child support,, 
an order assigning financial responsibility lor all o: . portion of child care 
expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent childien. necessitated by the 
employment or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that 
the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be 
adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent 
to provide chit " *;e dependent children, necessitated by the 
employment or training of the custodial parent. 
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(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes or new orders for the custody of the children and their support, 
maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and 
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, 
grandparents, and other members of the immediate family, the court 
shall consider the best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for 
peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an order 
establishing a visitation schedule a provision, among other things, 
authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court ordered visitation 
schedule entered under this chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation 
provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court shall order the 
petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing 
party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was without merit 
and not asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation 
order by a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family 
pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously 
granted by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, 
including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party 
because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered 
visitation. 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in 
determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient 
spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to 
produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in 
determining alimony. 
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(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard 
of living, existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in 
accordance with Subsection (a). However, the court shall consider all 
relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base 
alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In 
marriages of short duration, when no children have been conceived or 
born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living 
that existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, 
attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the 
threshold of a major change in the income of one of the spouses due to 
the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in 
dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of 
alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced 
through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may 
make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and 
awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short 
duration dissolves, and no children have been conceived or born 
during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the 
condition which existed at the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based 
on a substantial material change in circumstances not 
foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a 
new order for alimony to address needs of the recipient that did 
not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court 
finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any 
subsequent spouse of the payor may not be considered, except 
as provided in this subsection. 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent 
spouse's financial ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a 
subsequent spouse if the court finds that the payor's 
improper conduct justifies that consideration. 
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(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than 
the number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior 
to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances 
that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any 
order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically 
terminates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the 
remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony 
shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of 
annulment and his rights are determined. 
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former 
spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the 
former spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.16 (1996), which provides: 
(1) The child support order shall require that each parent share 
equally the reasonable work-related child care expenses of the parents. 
(2) (a) If an actual expense for child care is incurred, a parent 
shall begin paying his share on a monthly basis immediately upon 
presentation of proof of the child care expense, but if the child care 
expense ceases to be incurred, that parent may suspend making 
monthly payment of that expense while it is not being incurred, 
without obtaining a modification of the child support order. 
(b) (i) In the absence of a court order to the contrary, a 
parent who incurs child care expense shall provide written 
verification of the cost and identity of a child care provider to 
the other parent upon initial engagement of a provider and 
thereafter on the request of the other parent. 
(ii) In the absence of a court order to the contrary, 
the parent shall notify the other parent of any change of child 
care provider or the monthly expense of child care within 30 
calendar days of the date of the change. 
(3) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a 
parent incurring child care expenses may be denied the right to receive credit 
for the expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if the 
parent incurring the expense fails to comply with Subsection (2)(b). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the Court Below 
This is an action for divorce. The complaint was filed on November 8, 1994. The 
trial took place on November 16 and 17, 1995, and December 28 and 29, 1995. After trial, 
each of the parties filed submissions setting forth his or her position with respect to the real 
properties, notes, investment accounts, retirement accounts, and personal property owned by 
the parties at the time of trial. (See Plaintiffs Submission Re: Defendant's Proposed 
Property Distribution Set Forth in Defendant's Exhibit 25, dated February 9, 1996, R. at 221-
31, Addendum A; Defendant's Submission Re: Defendant's Proposed Property Distribution 
Set Forth in Defendant's Exhibit 25, dated February 21, 1996, R. at 232-53, Addendum B). 
The court issued its Memorandum Decision deciding the case on November 12, 1996. (R. at 
275-96, Addendum C). Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. at 298-
316A, Addendum D), and a Supplemental Decree of Divorce (R. at 317-29, Addendum E) 
were entered on December 27, 1996. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married on May 9, 1987. They had two children: Brittany Jane 
McDowell, born September 5, 1989, and Megan Elizabeth McDowell, born June 16, 1992. 
(Supplemental Findings of FactNos. 1 and 3). 
Plaintiff/appellant Laura E. Starley ("Ms. Starley") was employed at Nordstrom 
throughout the parties' marriage. At the time of trial, she was regional merchandise manager. 
Her work schedule required that she often work long hours, especially during sales. She was 
required to travel occasionally in connection with her employment. The parties had 
employed a nanny to care for their daughters because of the irregular hours that Ms. Starley 
was required to work. (Tr. at pp. 8-13). 
For most of the parties' marriage, defendant/appellee Steven D. McDowell ("Mr. 
McDowell") worked as a representative for Woolrich Clothing Company. He made a very 
substantial income from that source, approximately $120,000 per year. (Tr. at p. 17). In 
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addition to his work with Woolrich, throughout the marriage, Mr. McDowell bought and sold 
real property and related notes and contracts. At the time of trial, Mr. McDowell had 
terminated his employment with Woolrich and was spending full time on his business of 
purchase and sale of real property, notes, and contracts. In addition, Mr. McDowell was 
receiving rental income from some of the real properties he owned. 
The most recent tax return available for the parties for 1994 showed total income of 
approximately $332,000. Of that amount, $68,000 was attributable to Ms. Starley's 
employment with Nordstrom. The remainder was attributable to Mr. McDowell's 
employment or his real estate business. 
During the marriage, Mr. McDowell bought and sold many real properties. (E.g., Tr. 
at pp. 171, 181, Defendant's Exhibit 25, Tr. at pp. 379-407). At the time of trial, the parties 
owned a marital residence located on Oakridge Drive, which they had purchased together just 
prior to the marriage; a house located on Ontario in Park City, Utah; a house located on 
Sycamore Drive, which Mr. McDowell resided in; a duplex located on Park Avenue, Park 
City, Utah; and a house located on Blair in Salt Lake City, Utah. Only the two Park City 
properties had been owned by Mr. McDowell prior to the marriage. The other properties had 
been acquired during the marriage. 
In addition, the parties owned notes and real estate contracts with a value of more 
than $300,000, most of which had also not existed at the time that the parties married. 
Between the time of the marriage and the time of trial, Mr. McDowell had bought and sold a 
number of real properties and had acquired or changed the form of a number of notes. 
The court awarded Ms. Starley the marital residence on Oakridge Drive and her 
retirement accounts. (Supplemental Findings of Fact Nos. 15(k) and (j)). Ms. Starley was 
ordered to pay the mortgage on the marital residence. All of the other real properties, notes, 
and contracts were awarded to Mr. McDowell. He was also awarded his retirement account. 
The court found that the value of the property awarded to Mr. McDowell was $893,492 and 
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the value of the property awarded to Ms. Starley was $379,811. (Supplemental Findings of 
Fact No. 15). 
The court awarded custody of the children to Ms. Starley and ordered Mr. McDowell 
to pay child support of $882 per month. (Supplemental Findings of Fact Nos. 4 and 7). The 
court also ordered Mr. McDowell to pay one-half of traditional day care, but not the cost of a 
nanny or private school. (Supplemental Findings of Fact No. 9). 
The court ordered Mr. McDowell to pay alimony to Ms. Starley of $1,000 per month 
for one year. (Supplemental Findings of Fact No. 14). In addition, the court ordered Mr. 
McDowell to pay a portion of Ms. Starley's attorney's fees in the amount of $15,000. 
(Supplemental Findings of Fact No. 17). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The trial court abused its discretion in making an unequal and inequitable 
distribution of the parties' property. 
A. The trial court erred in failing to make findings of fact as to whether 
the property of the parties was premarital or marital. The Court of Appeals has 
repeatedly held that a trial court must properly characterize the parties' property as 
part of the marital estate or separate property of one or the other. In this case, the trial 
court failed to make findings as to which of the properties were marital and which 
were premarital. In doing so, the trial court erred. 
B. The trial court erred in awarding assets with a value of $379,811 to 
Ms. Starley and assets with a value of $893,942 to Mr. McDowell. The trial court 
must make an equitable division of the property. The presumption is that marital 
property will be divided equally between the parties. In this case, the trial court 
implied that the property of the parties had been commingled and was therefore 
marital. However, the trial court failed to divide the marital property equitably and to 
award each party his or her separate property and 50% of the marital estate. 
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II. The trial court did not make adequate findings of fact as to Mr. McDowell's 
income. The trial court ignored Mr. McDowell's historical income and accepted testimony 
of Mr. McDowell's accountant projecting his 1995 income. The trial court failed to follow 
the mandate of UTAH CODE ANN. §78-45-7.5 (Supp. 1997) and to determine Mr. 
McDowell's income from self-employment or operation of a business. Because the trial 
court's findings of fact on this issue were inadequate, this issue should be remanded. 
III. The trial court did not make adequate findings of fact to support its alimony 
award. The trial court failed to make findings as to the needs of Ms. Starley, the ability of 
Ms. Starley to provide support for herself, and the ability of Mr. McDowell to provide 
support to her. Because the trial court did not make sufficient findings as to the three 
necessary factors, the alimony issue should be remanded to the trial court. 
IV. The trial court erred in awarding alimony to Ms. Starley for a period of only 
one year. As previously indicated, the trial court did not make a finding as to Ms. Starley's 
need for alimony. However, its award of alimony implies that a need existed. There was no 
evidence that that need would decrease after one year. In awarding alimony for a period of 
only one year, the trial court erred. 
V. The trial court erred in failing to require Mr. McDowell to pay one-half of the 
cost of the nanny and the private school for the parties' children. In this case, an expense of a 
nanny was a reasonable, work-related child care expense, and the trial court erred in refusing 
to require Mr. McDowell to pay one-half of that expense. In addition, the trial court should 
have required Mr. McDowell to pay one-half of the cost of private schools for the children. 
VI. The trial court should award Ms. Starley's attorney's fees incurred in the 
appeal. The Court of Appeals has held that when attorney's fees in a divorce are awarded by 
the trial court to a party who prevails on appeal, fees should be awarded to that party on 
appeal. In this case, if Ms. Starley prevails in the appeal, she should be awarded her 
attorney's fees incurred in connection with the appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN MAKING 
AN UNEQUAL AND INEQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF THE 
PARTIES' PROPERTY. 
In this case, the trial court awarded property it found to have a net value of $893,942 
to Mr. McDowell and property it found to have a net value of $379,811 to Ms. Starley. The 
court explained this discrepancy by saying that Mr. McDowell had premarital assets of 
$450,000 and received an inheritance of $55,000. It apparently gave no credit to Ms. Starley 
for her premarital assets, her inheritance of $33,000, or her personal injury settlement of 
$30,000. 
A trial court in a divorce must make an equitable division of the parties' property. 
Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314. In this case, the court did not do so. 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Failing To Make Findings of Fact as to 
Whether the Property of the Parties was Marital or Premarital. 
The primary issue in the trial of this matter was whether certain of the real properties, 
investment accounts, notes, and personal property of the parties was marital or should be 
classified as premarital and therefore separate. Each of the parties presented extensive 
evidence on this issue and, after trial, each of the parties filed a detailed submission setting 
forth that party's position on the issue. Those submissions are included in the addendum 
hereto as A and B. 
Ms, Starley presented extensive evidence as to the commingling of marital monies 
and marital earnings with the premarital properties. For example, Ms. Starley presented 
evidence showing that at the time of the marriage, the cash flow from the rental properties 
owned by Mr. McDowell prior to the marriage was insufficient to make the mortgage 
payments. (Tr. at pp. 33-34). Thus, marital funds were used to supplement rental income in 
making mortgage payments. Ms. Starley also testified that she helped with the maintenance 
and management of the rental properties. The evidence further showed that Mr. McDowell 
borrowed money on the marital residence to assist in the purchase of various rental properties 
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and properties that were later sold, resulting in notes and contracts. Mr. McDowell's own 
testimony showed that proceeds from the sale of a property were generally deposited in 
marital accounts and might be used to meet marital obligations. 
In its memorandum decision, the trial court said the following: 
Neither party maintained a separate accounting for their premarital 
assets, and the dispositions thereof. Separate monies and efforts of both 
parties have been involved in preserving and enhancing the overall financial 
circumstances of the parties. Both parties recognized marital components and 
values involved in many of the assets. The division of assets contained herein 
generally traces the assets to the party of origin. It recognizes the significant 
portion of defendant's assets that were real estate investments in a rapidly 
appreciating real estate market. It takes into account their needs and 
perpetuates the investment business in which defendant earns his living. 
While the division does not result in a precise equal division of the marital 
estate, it nonetheless reasonably recognizes premarital contributions and the 
personal and business-related characteristics of the assets. From the 
foregoing, and considering all the provisions herein contained, the Court finds 
the foregoing distributions to be fair and equitable. 
(Memorandum Decision TJ 45). 
The court awarded assets to Ms. Starley that it valued at $379,811, and assets to Mr. 
McDowell, which it valued at $893,942. The only explanation given by the court for the 
unequal division of the assets was the fact that Mr. McDowell brought approximately 
$450,000 in assets into the marriage and received an inheritance from his mother of $55,000. 
The court said that Ms. Starley brought a number of premarital assets into the marriage, 
which were accounted for, but not carefully valued. The court noted that Ms. Starley had 
received $33,000 from her mother in November 1989, and a personal injury settlement of 
$30,000. No credit was apparently given to Ms. Starley for those assets. 
In Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990), the court said that a trial court must 
distribute properties between the parties to a divorce in a fair, systematic fashion. The court 
in Burt noted that a trial court should "first properly categorize the parties' property as part 
of the marital estate or as the separate property of one or the other. Each party is presumed to 
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be entitled to all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property." Id. 
at 1172. 
In this case, the trial court failed to make findings as to which of the properties of the 
parties were marital and which were premarital. Indeed, the court implicitly recognized that 
the properties of the parties had been commingled and had lost their separate character. As 
the trial court said, " [njeither party made a separate accounting for their premarital assets, 
and the dispositions thereof. Separate monies and efforts of both parties have been involved 
in preserving and enhancing the overall financial circumstances of the parties." 
(Memorandum Decision % 45, R. at 293). 
In Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah App. 1993), the court said: "Thus, under 
Burt, once a court makes a finding that a specific item is marital property, the law presumes 
that it will be shared equally between the parties unless unusual circumstances, memorialized 
in adequate findings, require otherwise." In this case, the trial court failed to make the 
findings as to which properties were marital and which items were premarital.1 As noted, the 
memorandum decision suggests that all the properties of the parties have been commingled, 
and the evidence justified that finding. The parties had purchased their marital residence 
together just prior to their marriage. The marital residence and the two properties located in 
Park City were the only real properties owned by either party prior to the marriage that had 
not been sold. Likewise, the premarital notes and real estate contracts had been repeatedly 
"rolled over," cashed out, or used to pay obligations, and had all changed form. 
In Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1321, the court said: "Premarital property may lose its separate 
distinction where the parties have inextricably commingled it into the marital estate, or where 
one spouse has contributed all or part of the property to the marital estate." In this case, the 
issue was whether such commingling or contribution to the marital estate had taken place. In 
1
 In its memorandum decision, the trial court did characterize some property as marital. These were the notes, 
contracts, and real properties that Mr. McDowell conceded were marital. 
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its decision, the trial court suggested that it had, but failed to make specific findings as to 
which of the parties properties were premarital or marital. In doing so, the trial court erred. 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Awarding Assets with a Value of $379,811 to 
Ms. Starley and Assets with a Value of $893,942 to Mr. McDowell. 
In Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, the trial court had awarded 24% of the marital property to 
Mrs. Dunn and 76% to her husband. This award was based on the trial court's finding that 
Dr. Dunn had contributed more to the marriage than Mrs. Dunn. In reviewing that award, the 
Court of Appeals said: "The overriding consideration in property division is 'that the 
ultimate division be equitable—that property be fairly divided between the parties given their 
contributions during the marriage and their circumstances at the time of the divorce.'" Id at 
1322. The court went on to say: 
On remand, the trial court should follow the systematic approach set forth in 
Burt. That is, the court should first properly categorize the parties' property as 
part of the marital estate or as the separate property of one or the other as set 
forth in this opinion. Each party is then presumed to be entitled to all of his or 
her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property. 
Id at 1323. 
In Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, the Court of Appeals said that the trial court had abused its 
discretion when it justified an unequal and inequitable distribution of marital property based 
solely on the parties' economic contributions to the marriage. In this case, the trial court 
abused its discretion when it divided the parties' marital property unequally, apparently based 
on the fact that Mr. McDowell claimed to have a greater amount of premarital property and 
the fact that he used investments in real property, contracts, and notes as his source of 
income. 
Trial courts routinely consider the value of income-producing assets in dividing 
marital estates, for example, a business owned by one of the parties that produces income is 
generally considered part of the marital estate and taken into account in determining values 
for a 50/50 division of the estate. E.g., Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877 (Utah App. 
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1995); Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 408 (Utah App. 1989). The fact that the real property 
business provided income to Mr. McDowell does not justify awarding those properties, notes, 
and contracts to Mr. McDowell, without a compensating award to Ms. Starley. 
A trial court's property distribution must be based on findings that place a dollar 
value on the distributed assets and liabilities. Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 119 (Utah 
App. 1990). This requirement is particularly important where each party brought assets to 
the marriage, and then upon divorce, each party claims to have made a substantial investment 
in the spouse's premarital assets and each disputes the values of both the investments and the 
resulting assets. Potter v. Potter, 845 P.2d 272 (Utah App. 1993). 
In Potter, 845 P.2d 272, each party brought assets into the marriage and claimed to 
have enhanced the value of those assets either through monetary contribution or personal 
services. The evidence and testimony were contradictory. The Court of Appeals found that 
the trial court's findings of fact did not provide a clear picture of the basis upon which the 
trial court resolved the disputed issues. The court said: 
There is no determination of the dollar value of either the premarital or marital 
assets. No mention is made of the value of Ms. Potter's decorating services as 
compared to Mr. Potter's monetary contributions from premarital assets. This 
court is presented with a cursory factual determination with no underlying 
reasoning as to the trial court's decision. 
Id at 274. 
In this case, Ms. Starley's submission filed February 9, 1996, listed each of the items 
of property owned by the parties and identified areas of disagreement between the parties as 
to the values of the property and whether the property was premarital or marital. For 
example, with respect to the property of the parties located at 42 Ontario in Park City, Utah, 
Mr. McDowell claimed that this property was premarital. Ms. Starley contended that it was 
purchased a short time before the marriage in December 1985, and that marital funds were 
used to augment its cash flow, reduce its mortgage, and make improvements. Thus, 
according to Ms. Starley, the property became commingled and therefore marital. In 
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addition, Mr. McDowell's equity in the property increased substantially due to reduction of 
the mortgage. 
Mr. McDowell also took the position that the second mortgage on the Ontario 
property should be considered a marital liability, but the property should not be found to be a 
marital asset. Ms. Starley's position was that the second mortgage has been used primarily to 
finance Mr. McDowell's real estate business. If the entire real estate business was a marital 
asset, the second mortgage should be a marital liability. If, however, the court did not find 
the real estate business to be a marital asset, the second mortgage should not be considered a 
marital liability. 
With respect to this property, the court entered the following findings: 
Defendant acquired the property located at 42 Ontario in Park City, 
Utah, in 1985, prior to the parties' marriage. The court finds that the value of 
the property is $240,000 as of the end of the year 1995. The remaining 
balance due on the first mortgage at the time of trial was just over $24,000, 
while the remaining balance due on the second mortgage was approximately 
$95,000. The second mortgage proceeds were utilized in obtaining notes and 
real estate which are a part of the investment business operated by defendant. 
The real property and the net equity therein of $121,000 should be awarded to 
defendant subject to the first and second mortgages, which defendant should 
pay and hold plaintiff harmless from. 
(Supplemental Findings of Fact No. 15(m)). Thus, the trial court never made a finding as to 
whether the property had become marital because of the factors cited by Ms. Starley or 
whether it should be considered premarital. 
Even more difficult to understand was the court's treatment of the assets that the 
parties agreed were marital. For example, the parties agreed that the real property located at 
2960 Adams had $32,800 in marital equity. The court awarded this property to Mr. 
McDowell, but did not indicate how it took into account $32,800 in equity in dividing the 
property of the parties. 
The court also found that the parties owned notes with a total value of $301,000, most 
of which the court found to be marital property; yet the court awarded all of the notes to Mr. 
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McDowell without any explanation of how their values were taken into account in dividing 
the marital estate. 
From the trial court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and from the trial court's 
memorandum decision, it is impossible to determine whether the court found that all the 
assets of the parties were marital, or whether the court found that some assets were 
premarital. If the court was attempting to find that all the assets were marital, the court 
offered no adequate explanation of its failure to divide the assets equally. If, on the other 
hand, the court was attempting to find that some assets were premarital and some were 
marital, the court gave no explanation of its findings in that regard and did not attempt to 
make the calculations required by this court's case law: 
(1) to properly characterize the parties' property as part of the marital 
estate or as separate property of one or the other of the parties; and 
(2) to award each party his or her separate property and 50% of the marital 
estate. 
The properties Mr. McDowell owned at the time of marriage were clearly 
commingled with marital property. Moreover, Mr. McDowell took a second mortgage on the 
parties' Oakridge residence to use for his real estate business. (Tr. at p. 54). Those funds 
were used in part to purchase the Lasso Loop rental property, which had been sold by the 
time of trial, to pay off a second mortgage on the Wilmont property, which had been sold by 
the time of trial, to purchase the property located at 3180 South 800 East, which had been 
sold by the time of trial. (Tr. at pp. 171-76). 
The Pippas note was an excellent example of the commingling that had taken place 
during the marriage. The parties agreed that the value of the Pippas note was $60,000. Mr. 
McDowell contended that this was a premarital asset. His own testimony indicated that he 
had sold property on 1870 South 2600 East to parties named Pack on December 31, 1986, 
just prior to the parties' marriage and received a note for $113,000. The Packs then sold the 
property to a Troy Young. Mr. Young assumed the balance on the note owed to Mr. 
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McDowell. In 1995, Mr. Young paid the balance of the note in the amount of $68,422.87, 
and Mr. McDowell then withdrew money from this account to make a loan to Pippas on 
another property. By Mr. McDowell's own argument, he had only $33,000 in equity in the 
property from which the Pippas note evolved at the time of the marriage. (Defendant's 
Submission, R. at 239). The court did not explain why it awarded the entire Pippas note to 
Mr. McDowell, just as it did not explain its disposition of the Chidaster note, the Park City 
properties, or many of the other assets of the parties. 
Since the trial court did not specify which assets and liabilities were premarital and 
which were marital, and implied that most or all of the assets were marital, it should have 
made equal division of the marital assets. In making an unequal division, the trial court 
erred. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS 
OF FACT AS TO MR. McDOWELL'S INCOME. 
The trial court found that there was no meaningful accounting available as to Mr. 
McDowell's 1995 income. (Supplemental Findings of Fact No. 6). Mr. McDowell estimated 
his 1995 income to be between $70,000 and $98,000. Mr. McDowell's accountant, Mr. 
Page, projected Mr. McDowell's 1995 income to be $76,081. The court used the figure of 
$80,000 per year to calculate child support. 
The evidence does not support this finding. Exhibit 5 was a collection of the parties' 
income tax returns from 1987 to 1994. Those income tax returns clearly showed increased 
income each year. The adjusted gross income shown on the tax returns was as follows: 









Mr. McDowell's accountant testified that some of the income for 1994 would be 
nonrecurring. In addition, a portion of the income, $68,000, was attributable to Ms. Starley's 
employment with Nordstrom. However, much of the income was directly tied to Mr. 
McDowell's work as a real estate investor. For example, Mr. Page testified that Mr. 
McDowell could expect to continue to receive $83,000 per year as interest income from his 
real estate contracts and notes. (Tr. at p. 316). By Mr. Page's own testimony, $40,000 in 
capital gains could be expected to recur. (Tr. at p. 317). Mr. McDowell's net rental income 
could be expected to be $8,560. 
As Ms. Starley's exhibit 29 showed, if the portions of the parties' 1994 income 
attributable to Woolrich and Nordstrom were subtracted, Mr. McDowell's gross income 
would be $200,049, or $16,670 per month. 
Although Mr. Page and Mr. McDowell testified on December 28, 1995, they made no 
attempt to quantify Mr. McDowell's actual 1995 income. Instead, the accountant's estimate 
was based on adjustments to 1994 income. However, since Mr. McDowell was no longer 
working for Woolrich in 1995, he could be expected to have more income from his work as a 
real estate investor than in previous years. Mr. Page made no explanation for the $54,000 in 
interest expense he claimed would be a legitimate deduction from 1995 income, nor did he 
take into account depreciation and other deductions in order to try to make some 
determination of the actual cash flow available to Mr. McDowell. (Tr. at p. 326,11. 19-23). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5 (Supp. 1997) defines gross income for purposes of 
determining child support. That section provides that gross income includes "prospective 
income from any source, including nonearned sources" and: 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, 
rents, gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, 
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, social 
security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment 
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from "nonmeans-
tested" government programs. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5 (Supp. 1997). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5(4)(a) provides: 
Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall 
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment 
or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses from 
self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to determine an 
appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to satisfy a child 
support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the business to 
operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross receipts. 
In this case, the trial court failed to calculate gross income as required by UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-45-7.5. For example, it accepted the accountant's testimony that Mr. McDowell's 
income from rental of real properties for 1994 was $8,560. This ignores the fact that Mr. 
McDowell had deducted from his gross rental income $14,184 in depreciation. As Mr. Page 
himself testified, depreciation is a noncash item. (Tr. at p. 326). The court also accepted Mr. 
McDowell's partnership income of $18,480 without any analysis. 
Ms. Starley attempted to show the parties' average income from Mr. McDowell's real 
estate business by subtracting the income each party received from Nordstrom or Woolrich in 
setting forth the income from real properties. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 11, Tr. at p. 18). Although 
Mr. Page testified that this exhibit was misleading, the exhibit he prepared to show income 
from Mr. McDowell's real property showed gross income of $780,277 and expenses of 
$568,070.63 over the years of the parties' marriage. (Defendant's Exhibit 18, Tr. at pp. 328-
30). 
In Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713, 717 (Utah App. 1990), the court said: "Detailed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law are necessary for this reviewing court to ensure that 
the trial court's discretionary determination of the . . . child support awards was rationally 
based." (Citation omitted). 
In Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, the defendant argued that the allocation of some of his 
business expenses should be dealt with as a matter of law. The court said that the trial court 
was in the best position to determine whether certain payments were necessary for the 
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business's reasonable operation, given the specific requirements in defendant's particular 
business and the history of its operation. 872 P.2d at 1067 (see footnote 2). In order to make 
this necessary determination, however, the trial court must make adequate findings of fact. 
Without adequate findings on the factors considered in the calculation of Mr. 
McDowell's income, the court must remand. Bake v. Bake, 772 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1989). 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS 
OF FACT TO SUPPORT ITS AWARD OF ALIMONY. 
This court has repeatedly set forth the factors a trial court must consider to make a 
determination as to an award of alimony. Those factors are as follows: 
(1) The financial condition and needs of the receiving spouse; 
(2) The ability of the receiving spouse to provide for him or herself; and 
(3) The ability of the payor spouse to provide support. 
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 (Utah App. 1994) (citations omitted). 
As the court said in Schaumberg, when a trial court has failed to make findings on the 
three factors listed above, this court will reverse, unless pertinent facts in the record are clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment. 875 P.2d 
at 602 (citations omitted). 
In this case, the trial court did make findings as to income to each of the parties, 
finding that Ms. Starley's income from Nordstrom was $4,622 per month and Mr. 
McDowell's income from his real estate investments was $6,667 per month. (Supplemental 
Findings of Fact Nos. 5 and 6). However, those findings did not take into account the actual 
cash flow available to Mr. McDowell or his net income available after payment of taxes. 
Likewise, no findings were made as to Ms. Starley's net income. 
In addition, although each of the parties presented evidence as to their monthly 
expenses, the court made no findings whatsoever on the need of Ms. Starley for alimony or 
the ability of Mr. McDowell to provide support. 
) 
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Mr. McDowell testified that his total monthly expenses were $4,043. Ms. Starley 
claimed her personal expenses, including the expense of nanny and private school, were 
$7,830.75. (Exhibit P-12, Tr. at pp. 19-26). Mr. McDowell had paid temporary child support 
of $900 per month and temporary alimony of $1,000 per month. Ms. Starley testified that 
she was required to incur additional debt to meet her expenses during the parties' separation. 
Mr. McDowell, on the other hand, had been able to pay his $4,043 monthly expenses, his 
taxes, temporary alimony of $1,000, child support of $900, and a portion of the child care 
costs with gross income that the court found to be $6,667 per month. The trial court 
apparently did not believe it was necessary to explain the discrepancy between what it found 
Mr. McDowell's income to be and the expenses he was able to pay, or in fact, to make any 
findings as to either party's expenses. 
Because the trial court did not make sufficient findings as to the three factors it was 
required to consider in determining alimony, the alimony issue must be remanded to the trial 
court for the entry of additional findings. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ALIMONY TO 
MS. STARLEY FOR A PERIOD OF ONLY ONE YEAR. 
The court made the following findings with respect to its alimony award: 
Given the large disparity in the assets awarded to the respective parties and the 
need of plaintiff to adjust her circumstances, alimony in the amount of $1,000 
per month, as ordered by this court on January 30, 1995, should be ordered to 
be continued through December 31, 1997. Alimony should terminate on the 
death of plaintiff, on her remarriage or cohabitation with a person of the 
opposite sex as determined by law. 
(Supplemental Findings of Fact No. 14). 
In a prior finding, the court had found Ms. Starley's income to be $4,622 per month 
and Mr. McDowell's income to be $6,667. (Supplemental Findings of Fact Nos. 5 and 6). 
As previously indicated, it is Ms. Starley's position that evidence did not support the 
trial court's finding with respect to Mr. McDowell's income. Mr. McDowell's actual income 
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was substantially higher than $6,667 per month. However, even if the finding with respect to 
Mr. McDowell's income were correct, the trial court erred in not making sufficient findings 
to support its award of alimony for only one year. 
In Thronson, 810 P.2d 428, the court listed the factors a trial court must consider in 
making an alimony award: 
1. the financial condition and needs of the party seeking alimony; 
2. that party's ability to produce sufficient income for him or 
herself; and 
3. the ability of the other party to provide support. 
Id. at 435 (citations omitted). 
As the court indicated in Thronson, "[f]ailure to analyze the parties' circumstances in 
light of these three factors constitutes an abuse of discretion." Id. at 435 (citations omitted). 
In Thronson, 810 P.2d 428, as in this case, the trial court had awarded alimony for a 
period of only one year. The Thronson court had made findings about Ms. Thronson's living 
expenses, her earning capacity, and Mr. Thronson's ability to provide support. The Court of 
Appeals found that the trial court had abused its discretion in making the alimony terminable 
after one year, because the shortfall in Ms. Thronson's ability to meet her needs would 
continue after the one-year period expired. 
In this case, the court did not make a finding as to Ms. Starley's needs. By awarding 
alimony, the court implied that Ms. Starley had a need for support. There was no evidence 
that her needs would decrease after a year; nor did the court make a finding that Ms. Starley's 
needs would decrease after one year. Other than its findings with respect to each of the 
parties' incomes, the court also did not make a finding as to Ms. Starley's ability to produce 
sufficient income for herself or the ability of McDowell to provide support. For those 
reasons, the trial court in this case, as the trial court in Thronson, 810 P.2d 428, abused its 
discretion in limiting the alimony award to one year. 
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V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REQUIRE MR. 
MCDOWELL TO PAY ONE-HALF THE COST OF THE 
NANNY AND PRIVATE SCHOOL FOR THE PARTIES' 
CHILDREN. 
The uncontroverted evidence at trial indicated that the parties' children had been 
cared for by a nanny since prior to the birth of the second child. The evidence also indicated 
that the children had attended private school. With respect to those issues, the court found as 
follows: 
The court finds that the parties cannot maintain the same standard of 
living after the divorce as they enjoyed before because two households require 
greater resources to support than one. The children have previously enjoyed 
the luxury of a nanny and attendance at private school, but the court will not 
order those things as a court-mandated child support obligation. The court 
will require the parties to share equally the expense of traditional day care 
expenses incurred by plaintiff in pursuing her employment; however, the court 
will not require defendant to pay one-half the cost of a private nanny. 
(Supplemental Finding of Fact No. 9). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.16 (1996) mandates that the court order each parent to 
share equally the reasonable work-related child care expenses of the parents. 
At the time of trial, the parties' younger child was three and the older child was six. 
The older child had been attending Carden School, a private school. The younger child was 
in preschool two mornings a week. Ms. Starley had been employed by Nordstrom for 
thirteen years. When Nordstrom had sales, she was required to work ten to twelve hours on 
Fridays and Saturdays, sixteen hours the first day of the sale, and often on Sundays. During 
the duration of the sale, she would be required to work each day. Likewise, during the 
Christmas season, her schedule was demanding. She was also required occasionally to travel 
in connection with her job. (Tr. at pp. 6-11). 
Given the circumstances of these parties, the cost of the nanny was clearly a 
reasonable work-related child care expense. Ms. Starley could not use ordinary day care, 
given the hours required in her employment and the necessity that she travel. The children 
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had a strong relationship with the nanny, and it was clearly in their best interests that their 
care by the nanny continue. 
With respect to private school costs, Ms. Starley testified that the parties had agreed 
to enroll the children in private school. (Tr. at p. 24). Again, the best interests of the children 
required continuation of this arrangement. In Brooks, 881 P.2d 955, the court indicated that a 
trial court could require payment of private school costs as additional child support. In this 
case, given the trial court's failure to make proper findings as to Mr. McDowell's income, its 
refusal to award the costs of private school was also in error. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD AWARD MS. STARLEY'S 
ATTORNEYS' FEES INCURRED IN THIS APPEAL. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-3 (1995) grants trial courts authority to order one party to 
pay the attorney's fees and costs of the other party. In this case, the trial court ordered Mr. 
McDowell to pay Ms. Starley's attorney's fees in the amount of $159000. This court has 
repeatedly held that, when the trial court awards attorney's fees in a divorce to a party who 
then prevails on appeal, fees should also be awarded to that party on appeal. Crouse v. 
Crouse, 817 P.2d 836 (Utah App. 1991), Bell, 810 P.2d 489. 
In this case, Ms. Starley was awarded attorney's fees in the trial court. Because she 
should prevail in this appeal, she should also be awarded her attorney's fees incurred in 
connection with this appeal. 
On remand, the trial court should be instructed to award additional attorney's fees in 
an amount to be determined. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite extensive evidence, argument, and post-trial submissions, the trial court failed 
to decide one of the central issues in this case—which of the parties' properties were marital 
and which were premarital. Instead, the trial court implied that the real properties, notes, and 
contracts had been commingled and had lost their separate character, and recognized that Mr. 
McDowell had changed the form of many premarital properties many times. Despite that 
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implied finding, however, the trial court awarded assets to Mr. McDowell it found to have a 
net value of more than twice the value of the assets it awarded to Ms. Starley. In doing so, it 
erred. 
The trial court also failed to make the requisite findings as to Mr. McDowell's income 
for purposes of calculating child support and determining alimony. 
Likewise, the trial court failed to make adequate findings on the three factors it is 
required to consider in awarding alimony and as to duration of alimony. 
This matter should be remanded to the trial court, so that the property can be divided 
equitably and for the entry of adequate findings of fact as to income, child support, and 
alimony. 
Ms. Starley should be awarded her attorney's fees incurred in connection with this 
appeal. 
DATED this 3 3 day of February, 1998. 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C. 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
P.O. Box 45561 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0561 
ELLElf^AYCOCK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT to be delivered by hand to the following, this Af__ day of February, 1998: 
John D. Sheaffer, Esq. 
Dart, Adamson & Donovan 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034 
Telephone: (801)531-7090 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAURA E. STARLEY, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
STEVEN D. MCDOWELL, ; 
Defendant. ] 
PLAINTIFF'S SUBMISSION 
) RE: DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED 
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION SET 
) FORTH IN DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 25 
Civil No. 94 490 4672 DA 
) Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Plaintiff makes this submission in response to defendant's proposed property distribution 
as set forth in defendant's exhibit 25. 
Real Property 
1. 1754 Oakridge. Salt Lake City, Utah 
Areas of Disagreement: 
a) Defendant contends the value of the property is $375,000. Plaintiff 
contends the value is $320,000 per an appraisal. (Exhibit 1). 
9* ft: 6/-9 
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b) Defendant contends that the mortgage balance is $156,070. Plaintiff 
testified that the latest statement from the mortgage company indicated a balance of 
$158,348. 
c) Defendant contends that he is entitled to a credit of $20,126 for a 
contribution to the down payment from his premarital funds. Plaintiff contends that the 
premarital contribution has been commingled. Plaintiff contributed to household 
expenses and paid for remodeling, decorating, and landscaping to the home. 
d) Defendant contends that the second mortgage on this property should be a 
marital liability. Plaintiff agrees with that contention so long as all the real properties 
accumulated by plaintiff and defendant are considered marital assets. If, however, the 
court were to find that the real property was defendant's separate property, then the 
second mortgage which was taken for purposes of paying liabilities incurred in 
connection with defendant's real estate business should be considered a separate liability. 
2. 42 Ontario. Park City, Utah 
Areas of Disagreement: 
a) Defendant claims this property was entirely premarital and separate. 
Plaintiff contends that it was purchased only a few months before the marriage 
(December of 1985) and that marital funds were used to augment cash flows, reduce the 
mortgage, and make improvements, such that the property became marital. Further, 
defendant's equity in the property has increased substantially since the time of the 
marriage. 
b) Plaintiffs appraisal valued the property at $240,000. (Exhibit 2). 
Defendant contends that it is worth $230,000 and defendant has no appraisal. 
2 ft i\ r* ^ " ') 
c) Defendant also contends that the second mortgage on this property should 
be considered a marital liability, but the property should not be considered a marital asset. 
Plaintiffs position is that the second mortgage was used primarily for defendant's real 
estate business. She considers the real estate business a marital asset. However, if the 
real estate business and this property are not marital assets, the second mortgage should 
not be considered a marital liability. 
3. 4721 Sycamore, Salt Lake City, Utah 
Area of Disagreement: 
Defendant contends that the court should consider this his separate property 
because he liquidated some stock options he owned prior to the marriage to make the 
down payment. Plaintiff contends that this is marital property because the proceeds of 
the stock sale were commingled, marital funds were used to pay the capital gains taxes on 
the stock sale (the net proceeds, after payment of taxes were not sufficient to make the 
down payment), and because marital funds were used to make payments on and 
improvements to this property. 
4. 1140 Pork Avenue, Park City, Utah 
Areas of Disagreement: 
a) Plaintiffs appraisal found the value to be $240,000. (Exhibit 4). 
Defendant had no appraisal performed, but contends that the value is $200,000. 
b) Defendant contends that this is his separate property because he purchased 
it prior to the marriage. Plaintiff contends that this is marital property because it was 
purchased just prior to the marriage (December of 1986). Plaintiff contributed to the 
maintenance and improvement of the property and marital funds were used to pay the 
mortgage payments, maintenance, property taxes, etc. Further, defendant had virtually no 
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equity in the property at the time of the marriage, since he made no down payment. 
(Exhibit D to defendant's Exhibit 25). 
5. 2960 Adams. Salt Lake City. Utah 
The parties agree that this property has $32,800 in marital equity. 
6. 1820 East Meadow. Salt Lake City. Utah 
The parties agree this property has no value. 
7. 2800 Blair. Salt Lake City. Utah 
The parties agree that this property has $19,271 in marital equity. 
Notes Receivable 
1. Tom McDowell Note Receivable 
The parties agree that this is a $4,000 marital asset. 
2. Baker Notes 
Area of Disagreement: 
Plaintiff contends that these notes have a marital value of $38,532; defendant 
contends that the marital value is $12,030. 
3. Plankenship Note 
Plaintiff accepts defendant's representation that this is an uncollectible judgment. 
However, plaintiff believes that the court should order any amounts collected to be shared 
equally between the parties. 
4. Olson Note 
Defendant has represented that this note was used to pay taxes. 
5. Brian Jones Note 
Plaintiff accepts defendant's testimony that this note was paid and used to make 
additional loans to: 
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Marvin Jones $ 10,067 
Candi Lot 14,420 
Rodriguez 15,485 
Sargetis 2,200 
6. Ivison Note 
The parties agree that the marital value of this note is $18,236. 
7. Brown Note 
The parties agree that the marital value of this note is $20,615. 
8. 3392 West 5700 South (Hardle) Note 
Plaintiff accepts defendant's representation that the marital value of this note is $5,962. 
9. 211 Wilmott Note 
Plaintiff accepts defendant's representation that this has no value. 
10. Alvey Note 
The parties agree that the marital value is $21,452. 
11. Washburn Note 
The parties agree that the marital value is $28,208. 
12. Overy Note 
The parties agree that the marital value is $47,851. 
13. Evans Note 
The parties agree that the marital value is $30,437. 
14. 1932 West Springfield (Paher) Note 
The parties agree that the marital value is $2,981. 
15. Umana 
The parties agree that the marital value is $10,789. 
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16. Sherrick Note (19% interest in balance of $18.6001 
The parties agree that the marital value is $3,534. 
17. Hovt Note (19% interest in balance of $14.5001 
The parties agree that the marital value is $2,755. 
18. Flores Note 
The parties agree that the marital value is $4,403. 
19. SdfNQte 
The parties agree that the marital value is $10,029. 
20. Eyre Note 
The parties agree that the marital value is $11,055. 
21. Stock Note 
The parties agree that the marital value is $9,947. 
22. Pippas Note 
Area of Disagreement: 
Defendant contends that this note is premarital in that he rolled it over from some 
premarital notes. Plaintiffs position is that the amount has increased, there can be no 
tracing, and that plaintiff contributed marital funds to negative cash flow for these 
properties. Plaintiffs position is that this should be considered a marital asset with a 
value of $60,000. 
23. Edgeware/Chidaster Note 
Plaintiff contends that this should be considered a marital asset of $20,782 because the 
funds cannot be traced and marital funds were used to supplement cash flow. 
Bank Accounts 
The parties agree on the values of the various bank and credit union accounts. 
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1. Smith Barney Account 
Plaintiff contends that this is her separate property with the funds having come from 
either her inheritance or her premarital personal injury proceeds. These funds have not 
been commingled. 
2. Children's Accounts 
The parties are in agreement that these accounts should be reserved for the use of the 
children. 
Retirement Accounts 
1. West One IRA 
Area of Disagreement: 
Defendant contends that the rnarital portion of this account is $35,240; plaintiff 
contends the marital portion is $114,837. 
2. Woolrich Pension Plan 
The parties agree that the marital portion is $15,583. 
3. Nordstrom Credit Union IRA 
The parties agree that this account is plaintiffs separate, premarital property. 
4. Nordstrom Stock Option Plan 
Area of Disagreement: 
Defendant contends that the value of this plan is $33,111; plaintiff contends the 
value is $23,330. 
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5. N<?rd?trom Profit Sharing Plan 
Area of Disagreement: 
Defendant contends that the value of the marital portion of this plan is $70,781; 
plaintiff contends that that value is $69,556. 
6. Nordstrom P.S. Plus Account 
Area of Disagreement: 
Defendant does not list a separate value for this account. Plaintiff represents the 
value of this account is $45,930. 
Personal Property and Miscellaneous 
1. 1994 Toyota Camry 
The parties agree on a marital value of $5,092 for this vehicle. 
2. 1939 QMC pickup true* I 
The parties agree on a marital value of $9,125 for this vehicle. 
3. 1986 Honda Accord , 
The parties agree on a marital value of $3,400 for this vehicle. 
4. 1990 Wells Cargo utility trailer 
The parties agree on a marital value of $1,500 for this vehicle. 
5. Plaintiffs Furniture 
Plaintiff contends that the value of the furniture in her possession is $9,600. Defendant 
claims that the value is $22,440. Defendant was allowed to take many items from the 
house, and at the time of trial, selected additional items he wished to take from the home. 
6. Defendant's Furniture 
Plaintiff accepts defendant's representation that the furniture and furnishings in his 
possession have a value of $14,750. 
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7. Cottonwood Club Membership 
The parties agree that the marital value of this asset is $5,950. 
8. Jewelry I 
Plaintiff contends that the jewelry in her possession has negligible value and that the 
appraisal relied upon by defendant was a high appraisal for insurance purposes. 
Debts and Obligations 
1. Second mortgage on Oakridge I 
Defendant contends that this is a marital liability, but that the property which it secures is 
not marital. Plaintiff agrees that it is a marital liability so long as the property is a marital 
asset. 
2. E. P. Starlev. M.D. 
Plaintiff incurred this obligation to her father for funds received to support her during the 
parties' separation. 
3. Granite Furniture Company 
4. Providian Bank 
Plaintiff incurred this obligation for her needs during the parties' separation. 
5. Nordstrom 
Plaintiff incurred this obligation for her needs during the parties' separation. 
6. First Interstate 3ank Visa 
Plaintiff incurred this obligation to meet her needs during the parties' separation. 
7. American Express 
Plaintiff incurred this obligation to meet her needs during the parties' separation. 
8. Trade Bptt 
Plaintiff incurred this obligation to meet her needs during the parties' separation. 
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Summary 
The parties' tax returns clearly indicate defendant's real property business had a negative 
cash flow for many of the years of the marriage. Plaintiff assisted in the maintenance of the 
properties through her contributions to marital income. In addition, plaintiff participated in the 
improvements to the properties. Marital funds were used to reduce the indebtedness on all the 
properties. Several of the properties have fifteen year mortgages and so the equity has 
substantially increased during the marriage through the use of funds which would otherwise have 
been available to the marriage. Further, plaintiff has participated in payment of capital gains 
taxes on the sales of the various real properties. 
Defendant also cannot trace the monies relating to the real properties. Rent and sales 
proceeds were deposited in various accounts and used for many purposes, including marital 
purposes. Marital funds were deposited in those same accounts. For these reasons, the court 
should find that all the properties are marital and make its distribution accordingly. 
Other Issues Remaining for Decision 
1. The amount of child support. 
2. The amount of alimony. 
3. Payment of work-related child care costs, especially costs of the nanny. 
4. Payment of private school costs. 
5. Attorneys' fees award. 
6. Maintenance of life insurance. 
7. Additional amounts claimed to be due from defendant to plaintiff for child support, 
alimony, and the children's expenses. (Exhibit 14). 
8. Medical insurance and medical expenses owed by defendant to plaintiff. (Exhibit 17). 
9. Award of tax exemptions. 
10 u c', j , o o ;> 
DATED this ^f day of February, 1996. 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C. 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2034 
M. 1 I Bv •^)a^—*/ PA 
ELLEN MAYCOCK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S 
SUBMISSION RE: DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION SET 
FORTH IN DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 25 to defendant's counsel, at the following address, 
postage prepaid, this J__ day of February, 1996: 
John D. Sheaffer, Esq. 
Dart, Adamson & Donovan 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
> ' /* 
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JOHN D. SHEAFFER, JR. (2930) 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
310 South Main Street. Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
RLEQ 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CO 
<•• A 
ss/'l •JZVJji' „ 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
LAURA E. STARLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STEVEN D. MCDOWELL, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S SUBMISSION 
RE: DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED 
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION SET 
FORTH IN DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 25 
Civil No. 944904672 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
-oOo-
COMES NOW defendant, Steven D. McDowell, by and through his attorney, John D. 
Sheaffer, Jr., and submits the following in response to Plaintiffs Submission Re: Defendant's Proposed 
Property Distribution as Set Forth in Defendant's Exhibit 25 and defendant's Proposed Property 
Distribution, and in support of his petition that his existing premarital property should be confirmed as 
his separate assets: 
REAL PROPERTY 
1. 1754 Oakridae. Salt Lake Citv. Utah. 
A reos of Disagreem ent: 
a. Plaintiff contends the value of the property is $320,000 based upon an 
appraisal conducted April 2. 1993. (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 1). Defendant, with substantial 
experience, knowledge and success in residential real estate investment testified that residential real estate 
values in the Salt Lake Valley have increased by an average of approximately 17% in the past year, that 
he put approximately $9,528 into the property in money and labor since the appraisal (sec Defendant's 
Trial Exhibit No. 5) and that the property has a value of at least $375,000 as of the date of trial. 
b. Plaintiff contends that the mortgage balance is $158,348. Defendant 
contends that the mortgage balance was $156,070 on December 1, 1995, and is now $154,749 as set forth 
in the loan amortization schedule on page 8 of Exhibit "A" attached to Defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 25. 
c. Plaintiff testified that defendant contributed his premarital funds to acquire 
this property, but she contends that the contribution is commingled, making all the equity in this property 
marital. Defendant contends that he is entitled to a credit of $20,126 as his contribution towards the 
down-payment of this property from the contract sale proceeds of his premarital duplex at 373-375 East 
800 South as verified on pages 3, 6 and 9 of Exhibit "A" attached to defendant' Trial Exhibit No. 25 
tracking the duplex contract sales proceeds into the total deposit and cash down-payment made by him 
on the Settlement Statement for the purchase of Oakridge. Defendant contends that he is entitled to this 
premarital credit and is not seeking interest or appreciation on it, which would be shared by plaintiff as 
marital property. 
d. Defendant contends that the Equiline obligation on Oakridge should be 
a marital liability because it was incurred towards the acquisition of other investment properties and notes 
during the marriage which are marital properties to be equitably distributed between the parties. Plaintiff 
contends that all notes and real properties are marital debts, including those acquired by defendant prior 
to this marriage. The parties' accountant, Bill Page, analyzed the property that defendant acquired prior 
to the marriage. He testified that the net cash flow from these properties was positive after deducting all 
expenses related to them during the period of the marriage. See defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 31. He 
further stated that plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 11 was "misleading" because it included the amounts for 
passive depreciation, expense and loss from Ms. Starley's premarital condominium reflected on the parties' 
tax returns were not deducted to show defendant's positive cash flow during the marriage. 
e. Plaintiff claims that she should be awarded this home and real property 
and sufficient alimony and child support to maintain herself in it. Defendant agrees that plaintiff should 
be awarded the home and real property so long as she is willing to assume the financial responsibility of 
the mortgage obligations and other high expenses associated with it, which defendant contends are 
unnecessary, cannot be afforded by the plaintiff and should not be a basis for a reasonable expense need 
for alimony. Defendant testified that plaintiff and the parties' two minor children are not established in 
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the Oakridge neighborhood, attend school elsewhere, have no friends or ties to this home, and that other 
comparable homes are available in the same area at a list sales price in the $159,000 to $229,000 range. 
See defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 10. 
2. 42 Ontario/Chambers Street, Park City, Utah. 
A reas of Disagreem ent: 
a. Plaintiff claims this property is entirely marital. Defendant claims it is 
entirely premarital and should be confirmed as his separate property and not part of the marital estate. 
He testified that this property and the debt have always remained in his separate name since the property 
was purchased approximately eighteen months prior to the marriage. The parties' accountant, Bill Page, 
testified on his analysis that defendant's premarital properties had sufficient cash flow to maintain all 
expenses associated with them during the marriage. See defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 31. Defendant 
testified on his exhibits demonstrating this Park City property had at least $47,500 in equity at the time 
of the marriage (defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 27) as reflected on the third page of Exhibit "A" attached 
to defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 25. Defendant contends that no marital assets were used for 
improvements to this property, and any improvements made were significant in relation to the substantial 
passive appreciation in the value of this property during the marriage simply by virtue of its location in 
Park City, Utah. 
b. Plaintiff contends that the property has a market value of $240,000 as set 
forth in the appraisal as plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 2. Defendant contends that this Appraisal overvalues 
the property by $10,000, which is the value ascribed to the furniture in the premises on page 2 of the 
Appraisal when that furniture is his premarital property, not a fixture associated with the property, and 
is, in any event, essentially worthless. Therefore, defendant contends the value of the real estate is 
$230,000 excluding furniture. 
c. Plaintiff claims that the second mortgage was used for defendant's real 
estate investments and should be considered a marital debt with all defendant's property, as marital assets. 
If the Court determines this property is not a marital asset, then she claims the second mortgage should 
not be a marital liability. Defendant contends that this is his separate premarital property but the second 
mortgage on this property is a marital debt because it was incurred during the marriage for the acquisition 
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of post-marital notes and real estate which are marital property; this mortgage reflects the marital equity 
in said post-marital assets to be divided between the parties. 
3. 4721 Sycamore. Salt Lake City, Utah. 
A re as of Disagreem ent: 
a. Plaintiff contends this is entirely marital property because defendant's 
premarital Woolrich stock sold to acquire the property was commingled, marital funds were used to pay 
taxes on the sale and because marital funds were used to maintain the property. Defendant contends that 
this property in which he resides was acquired entirely from the sale of his Woolrich stock options owned 
prior to the marriage in the sum of $67,808.40 pledged in his loan application as the source of 
down-payment for the purchase of the property in November 1993 as set forth on pages 1, 2, 3, 4 and 10 
of Exhibit "C" attached to defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 25. Defendant testified the property and debt 
associated with it have always been in defendant's sole name, rental cash flow prior to plaintiffs 
occupancy paid for any improvements and that the capital gains from the stock sale were ultimately paid 
in 1994 when defendant liquidated further Woolrich premarital retirement assets after the loss of his 
Woolrich job. 
4. 1140 Park Avenue. Park City, Utah. 
Areas of Disagreement: 
a. Plaintiff claims this property is worth $240,000 as set forth in the 
Appraisal, plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 4. Defendant, with substantial knowledge and experience as to the 
value of his property investments, contends the property is overstated by $40,000 and has a market value 
of $200,000 after adjustments and deductions from the appraised value in the following amounts and for 
the following reasons: (1) the appraisal value includes $10,000 for furniture in the premises, part of which 
was purchased with the premises, (2) the tenant, Mr. Dale Stout, testified the furniture is his furniture and 
the remainder is "junk" having no value; (3) defendant testified an additional approximately $30,000 in 
repairs and adjustments from the appraised value is appropriate because the roof is in bad disrepair, 
requiring an expenditure of approximately $5,000 in the immediate future, the rear garage encroaches over 
the property7 line, depreciating the property by approximately $12,500, and the property is in a flood plane 
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with increased flood insurance and associated expenses depreciating the market value of the property 
further. See defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 25. 
b. Defendant claims this is his separate premarital property because it was 
acquired prior to the parties' marriage, the title and liability associated with this property has always been 
in defendant's separate name, and all expenses associated with the property, (including the property 
management and taxes) were covered by the positive rental cash-flow from this property and from all 
defendant's premarital property as verified by the parties' accountant, Bill Page, and his analysis set forth 
in the Profit and Loss Report 1/1/87 through 12/31/94 received as defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 31. 
Plaintiff contends that the property was maintained and improved by her or with marital funds. Defendant 
contends that the cash flow from this property and other premarital properties amply met all expenses 
associated with it, any "maintenance" contribution by plaintiff was minimal because the property was 
professionally managed by others, and that the substantial equity in this property reflects passive 
appreciation in its value simply by virtue of its location in Park City, Utah. Further, though defendant 
purchased the property with a minimal down-payment, defendant has expertise in acquiring undervalued 
real estate and believed it to have an equity of at least $10,000 at the time of acquisition as set forth in 
defendant's Trial Exhibit (Revised) No. D-6. 
5. 2960 Adams. Salt Lake City. Utah. 
The parties agree that this property has $32,800 in marital equity. 
6. 1820 East Meadow. Salt Lake City. Utah. 
The parties agree this property has no value. 
7. 2800 Blair. Salt Lake City. Utah. 
The parties agree that this property has $19,271 in marital equity, which defendant 
testified was acquired through a $20,000 payment on the Baker Note receivables. 
NOTES RECEIVABLE 
1. Tom McDowell Note Receivable. 
The parties agree that this is a $4,000 marital asset. The plaintiff disagrees with 
defendant's contention that the loan amount was made from the proceeds received by defendant through 
the second mortgage Equiline on the Oakridge property. 
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2. Baker Notes. 
Areas of Disagreement: 
The plaintiff contends these notes have a marital value of $38,532. Defendant's 
uncontroverted testimony was that these notes have a value of $12,030 after receipt of a partial payment 
by his long-term investor partner Mr. Baker in acquiring and improving 2800 Blair, which is a marital 
property that the parties agree has marital equity of $19,271. 
3. Blankenship Note. 
The parties agree that this is an uncollectible judgment, but plaintiff desires any 
amounts collected to be shared equally between the parties. This is acceptable to defendant provided that 
any tax liability is also shared equally. 
4. Olson Note. 
It is uncontroverted that the proceeds of the Olson note were used to pay taxes 
for the parties. 
5. Brian Jones Note. 
The parties agree the proceeds of these notes now reflect notes receivable to: 
Marvin Jones $10,067 
Candi Lot 14,420 
Rodriguez 15,485 
Sargetis 2,200 
6. Ivison Note. 
The parties agree the marital value of this note is $18,236. 
7. Brown Note. 
The parties agree that the marital value of this note is $20,615. 
8. 3392 West 5700 South (Hardle) Note. 
The parties agree to defendant's representation that the marital value of this note 
is $5,962. 
211 Wilmott Note. 
The parties agree that this note has no value. 
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10. Alvev Note. 
The parties agree that the note has a marital value of $21,452. 
11. Washburn Note. 
The parties agree that this note has a marital value of $28,208. Defendant 
contends this marital value was acquired from proceeds of the Equiline second mortgage on Oakridge. 
12. Overv Note. 
The parties agree that this note has a marital value of $47,851. 
13. Evans Note. 
The parties agree that this note has a marital value of $30,437. 
14. 1932 West Springfield (Daher) Note. 
The parties agree that this note has a marital value of $2,981. 
15. Umana. 
The parties agree that this note has a marital value of $10,789. 
16. Sherrick Note (19% interest on balance of $18,600). 
The parties agree that the marital value is $3,534. 
17. Hovt Note (19% interest on balance of $14.500). 
The parties agree that the marital value is $2,755. 
18. Flores Note. 
The parties agree that the marital value is $4,403. 
19. Self Note. 
The parties agree that the marital value is $10,029. 
20. Evre Note. 
The parties agree that the marital value is $11,055. 
21. Stock Note. 
The parties agree that the marital value is $9,947. 
22. Pippas Note. 
Areas of Disagreement: 
Plaintiff claims this receivable of $60,000 is a marital asset maintained through 
marital funds. Defendant contends that the asset is clearly premarital, though the form of the asset has 
changed since it was acquired. His testimony and Exhibit "I" attached to defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 
25 demonstrates that plaintiff sold the property at 2600 East to the Packs on December 31, 1986, prior 
to the parties' marriage, carrying a note of even date for $113,900 secured by an all-intrusive Trust Deed 
on said date. On December 22, 1992, the Packs sold the property to Troy Young, and Mr. Young 
assumed the balance of the Pack Note owing to defendant, the note again being secured by an all-inclusive 
Trust Deed on the property with the underlying first and second mortgage still in place. On July 14, 
1995, Mr. Young paid the balance of the note owing to defendant in the sum of $68,422.87 through 
Associated Title Company Check No. 6178, deposited into defendant's First Security Bank account on that 
same date. On July 20, 1995, plaintiff pulled $60,000 out of this account by cashier's check to Superior 
Title Company for the Pippas loan and took back a Trust Deed note on that same day for $60,000 signed 
by Mr. Pippas and defendant. See defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 251. Further, the parties' accountant, Bill 
Page, testified on his analysis that the cash flow from defendant's premarital properties, including the 2600 
East property, were not only sufficient to maintain all expenses associated with these properties during 
the parties' marriage, but in fact resulted in substantial positive income which was contributed by 
defendant to the marriage far in excess of all expenses associated with maintaining premarital properties. 
Defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 31. At the time of the parties' marriage, defendant had $33,000 in equity 
in the 2600 East property upon which the Pippas note is based. See defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 27 
(revised) D-6 (Premarital Assets at Time of Marriage). 
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23. Edgeware/Chidaster Note. 
Areas of Disagreement: 
Plaintiff claims this is a marital asset of $20,782 for the same reason she claims 
the Pippas note is a marital asset. Defendant contends, like the Pippas note, that this asset of $20,782 is 
a premarital asset having simply changed form from the Edgevvare real estate interest having equity of 
$31,000 at the time of the marriage (See Defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 27). As demonstrated by 
defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 25 and Exhibit "J" attached, defendant contends that the Edgeware property 
was owned solely by him at the time of the parties' marriage as reflected in the parties' residential loan 
application dated 1986, and it was subsequently sold May 1988 to Janet Christensen on a note in favor 
of defendant secured by the property. Janet Christensen was subsequently divorced and is now known 
by the name Chidaster and owes defendant the balance due on the note. Likewise, testimony from the 
parties' accountant. Bill Page, and his analysis set forth in defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 31 as adjusted 
by Mr. Page's testimony shows defendant's premarital property cash flows were sufficient to maintain this 
asset throughout the marriage without any marital contribution and that the property had a net positive 
cash flow of approximately $180 per month. 
BANK ACCOUNTS 
The parties agree on the values of the various bank and credit union accounts set forth 
in defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 25. 
INVESTMENT A CCOUNTS 
1. Smith Barnev Account. 
Areas of Disagreement: 
Plaintiff testified that this is her separate property from either inheritance or a 
personal injury award and that the funds have not been commingled. Defendant contends that the account 
is marital property having been commingled, spent down and deposited up during the marriage and never 
verified by plaintiff as an existing asset on her loan applications. 
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2. Children's Accounts. 
The parties agree these accounts are to be reserved for the use of the children 
requiring the signature of each party for any withdrawal and no withdrawal without mutual consent 
between the parties. 
RETIREMENT A CCOUNTS 
1. West One IRA. 
Areas of Disagreement: 
Plaintiff claims that the marital portion of this account is $114,837. Defendant 
contends that the marital portion of this account totaling $141,626 is $35,240 as reflected in defendant's 
Trial Exhibit No. 8 and Exhibits "A" through "E" attached thereto showing that the account has a total 
value of $141,626 (D8-A). No deposits into the account were made until March 29, 1994, in the sum of 
$879.53, which when taken from the total account value on that date of $53,048.56 shows premarital 
value of $52,169.03. See defendant's Trial Exhibit 8-D. On December 31, 1987, approximately at the 
time the parties married, defendant's salesman pension plan had a year-end account balance of $26,789, 
with no contribution for that year, the accumulated earning of which totaled $49,369 when terminated and 
rolled into the West One IRA. See defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 8-C. The defendant subsequently 
received interest earnings of $4,856.84 on his premarital portion of his salesman pension plan from what 
had previously been rolled out. See defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 8-D. After these total amounts of 
premarital retirement account value of $106,386.60 is credited against the total current value of the West 
One IRA of $141,626.78, the net marital value of this retirement account is $35,240.12. 
2. Woolrich Pension Plan. 
The parties agree that the marital portion is $15,583. 
3. Nordstrom Credit Union IRA. 
Defendant accepts plaintiffs value of the Nordstrom's Credit Union IRA of $6,885 
as her separate premarital property. 
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4. Nordstrom Stock Option Plan. 
Areas of Disagreement'. 
Plaintiff claims the value of her stock options as $23,330 based on a low value 
of approximately $39.00 per share, which did not include options vested on November 15, 1994. 
Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 27. Defendant contends plaintiff has undervalued the stock options and that 
they have a value of $33,111 based on current trading price per share of $42.50 up to a value of 
$40,434.63 if exercised at $45.00 per share as the high trade marital value per share has been in the past 
year. See defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 21 and defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 19 reflecting the analysis 
and testimony of the parties' accountant. Bill Page. 
5. Nordstrom Profit Sharing Plan: 
A reas of Disagreem ent: 
Defendant contends that the value of the marital portion of this plan is $70,781; 
plaintiff contends that the value is $69,556, a difference of $1,225 reflecting the increase in earnings to 
this account between the statement balance on October 3, 1995, of $80,663 reflected in Plaintiffs Trial 
Exhibit No. 22 and the value on November 13, 1995 set forth in Defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 25, page 4. 
6. Nordstrom P.S. Plus Account. 
Defendant accepts plaintiffs representation that this account has a current marital 
value of $45,930 as set forth in defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 2. 
PERSONAL PROPERTY AND MISCELLANEOUS 
1. 1994 Tovota Camrv. 
The parties agree on a marital value of $5,092 for this vehicle. 
2. 1989 GMC Pick-up Truck. 
The parties agree on a marital value of $9,125 for this vehicle. 
3. 1986 Honda Accord. 
The parties agree on a marital value of $3,400 for this vehicle. 
11 
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4. 1990 Wells Cargo Utility Trailer. 
The parties agree on a marital value of $1,500 for this vehicle. 
5. Plaintiffs Furniture. 
Plaintiff contends that the value of the furniture in her possession is $9,600. 
Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 19. Defendant contends that this property has an itemized value of $22,440, 
for a difference of $12,840. Defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 12. Defendant testified he would accept any 
of the items of furniture in plaintiffs possession at the values he ascribes to them and plaintiff testified 
she would not sell the items to defendant at her values. Defendant desires certain particular items of 
property as itemized in defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 26. 
6. Defendant's Furniture. 
The parties agree that the furniture and furnishings in defendant's possession have 
a value of $14,750 as set forth in defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 11. 
7. Cottonwood Club Membership. 
The parties agree that the marital value of this asset is $5,950 as set forth in 
plaintiff Trial Exhibit No. 25. 
8. Jewelry. 
Plaintiff did not list the value of jewelry in her possession on her proposed 
distribution set forth in plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 18. She contends the value of her jewelry is 
negligible, but testified that the appraisals valued the jewelry at $27,810. Defendant contends the value 
is $21,810, as set forth in defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 13 State Farm Insurance Policy value which 
defendant contends is fair. Defendant contends that he should be awarded the sapphire ring which he 
testified was made from his father's wedding band at a value of $2,300, which was not reflected as a value 
on the insurance policy. Defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 13. See defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 25 at page 
4. 
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DEBTS AND OBLIGA TIONS 
1. Second Mortgage on Oakridge. 
Defendant contends that this Equiline obligation is a marital liability incurred to 
acquire certain notes receivable that the parties agree are marital property. Plaintiff claims aU notes 
receivable are marital property and defendant contends that the Pippas and Edgeware notes are premarital 
value and that $20,126 of the Oakridge equity is defendant's separate property as his contribution towards 
the down-payment from premarital funds. See defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 25, pages 1 through 5. 
2. E. P. Starlev. M.D. 
Plaintiff claims this obligation of $5,000 is a marital liability but admits it was 
incurred by her subsequent to the parties' separation and after the Court entered its Temporary Orders of 
support and that it has no terms of repayment. Defendant contends plaintiff should be responsible for this 
debt because it is either a gift or advance on inheritance, it was incurred after the Court set temporary 
support obligations based upon plaintiffs representation of her monthly expenses, and because plaintiff 
failed to live within the budget set for her by incurring unreasonable expenses after separation, such as 
private school for the children, in-home nanny care, plus regular day care, out-of-state travel, etc. 
3. Granite Furniture Company. 
Plaintiff contends this obligation of $1,060 is a marital debt as set forth in 
Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 18. Defendant contends that this debt was incurred by plaintiff to acquire 
furniture subsequent to the parties' date of separation and is therefore her separate debt along with the 
property it represents. 
4. Providian Bank. 
Plaintiff claims this credit card obligation of $5,733 is a marital debt, but it was 
incurred after the parties' separation and the Court's Temporary Support Orders. For these reasons, 
defendant contends this debt should be plaintiffs separate responsibility and that it is a credit card balance 
reflecting other duplicative itemized expenses plaintiff claims as household needs. 
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5. Nordstrom. 
Plaintiff claims this obligation of $4,288 should be treated as a marital debt. For 
the same reasons as set forth above with regard to the Providian Bank credit card debt, defendant contends 
that this should be treated as plaintiffs separate responsibility and not as a marital liability. 
6. First Interstate Bank Visa. 
Plaintiff claims that this obligation of $4,288 should be treated as a marital debt. 
For the same reasons as set forth above with regard to the Providian Bank credit card debt, defendant 
contends this should be plaintiffs sole and separate responsibility and not a marital liability. 
7. American Express. 
Plaintiff contends this obligation of $3,817 should be treated as a marital liability. 
For the same reasons set forth above with regard to the Providian Bank credit card debt, defendant 
contends this should be plaintiffs separate responsibility and not a marital liability. 
8. Trude Bott. 
Plaintiff contends this obligation of $2,300 owing to her sister should be treated 
as a marital liability. For the same reasons set forth above with regard to the E. P. Starley debt, defendant 
contends this should be plaintiffs separate responsibility and not a marital liability. Further, this "debt" 
is not reflected by any promissory note. 
Plaintiff claims that these total post-separation and post-support order debts incurred by 
her in the total amount of approximately $27,315 (an average of approximately $2,276 per month) should 
be a charge against the marital estate. Defendant contends that these debts were unreasonably incurred 
by plaintiff after the Court's Temporary Order, should therefore be her sole responsibility, and can be paid 
by her from her share of the marital estate. 
9. Estimated Taxes Owed for 1995. Defendant claims estimated federal quarterly 
taxes of $6,382 and self-employment taxes of $2,300, for a total of $8,682 owed by him for the 1995 tax 
year. Defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 25 at page 5. Plaintiff docs not address this issue in her submission. 
14 
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Defendant contends that the taxes should be treated as a marital liability incurred while he supported 
plaintiff pursuant to the Court's temporary support and invested in notes the parties agree are marital 
property 
OTHER ISSUES REMAINING FOR DECISION 
1. The amount of child support 
2. Whether alimony should be awarded to plaintiff and, if so, the level and duration 
3. Whether defendant should be responsible for any in-home nanny costs in addition 
to regular day care and preschool costs 
4 Whether defendant should be obligated to pay private school tuition costs for any 
of the children in addition to his child support obligation 
5. Whether any attorney's fees should be award to the plaintiff 
6. Whether any insurance on plaintiffs life should be obtained, if so, the face amount 
and whether it should be obtained and maintained by plaintiff or defendant 
7 Whether defendant should reimburse plaintiff as additional child support for 
expenses of nanny insurance, pnvate school and summer tuition, uniforms, lessons and extracurricular 
expenses of the children from December 1994 
8 Whether defendant should be responsible for $1,144 in past uncovered medical 
insurance and premiums and incurred from October 1994 that plaintiff did not request from defendant 
until trial. 
9 The award of dependent tax exemptions parties 
SUMMARY OF DEFENDANTS POSITION RE: EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION 
The evidence clearly demonstrates that, by anyone's calculations, the plaintiff will receive 
approximately $388,694 in an equitable distribution of the parties' assets and liabilities accumulated during 
this relatively short marriage of less than eight years, begun at a time when plaintiff had accumulated 
relatively little premantal values See Summary of Defendant's Proposed Distribution of Assets and 
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Liabilities attached hereto. Except for the marital home, the parties kept their accounts, investments and 
debts separate. At the time of the marriage, defendant owned approximately $522,000 in property, 
investments and inheritance equity. Defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 27 (Revised D-6). Of these premarital 
assets, approximately $200,000 in equity was commingled into the marital estate through investments and 
turn-overs. Defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 28. However, approximately $495,938 of the premarital assets 
continue to exist. Defendant's Trial Exhibit No. 29. Out of these premarital properties, values have also 
been clearly tracked by defendant and his Exhibits, as well as the testimony of Bill Page, the parties' 
accountant, who analyzed the premarital property and stated that they were not only self-maintaining, but 
the cash flow from them was approximately $212,000 in excess of their expenses and greatly contributed 
to the marital cash flow. See Defendant's Exhibit No. 31. Defendant requests the Court to confirm these 
separate properties as non-marital and distribute the marital property in accordance with his Proposed 
Division. The difference between the values plaintiff seeks in her proposed distribution and those sought 
by defendant is essentially the value of defendant's premarital property at the time of marriage, which 
continues to exist. Despite plaintiffs contention, the weight of the evidence clearly demonstrates that any 
assistance in maintaining defendant's premarital property was very limited and inconsequential to their 
total value accumulated in great part through passive appreciation in the real estate market. In fact, 
defendant's premarital investments sheltered the parties' marital income and was sufficient to not only pay 
all capital gains and expenses on the properties but additionally in excess of $100,000 over the property 
expense during the course of the marriage. 
Plaintiff will receive approximately $388,694 in net equity, including her options and 
retirement accounts. In addition, she earns substantial income averaging in excess of $65,000 per year 
excluding to company contributed pension benefits, which are not available to defendant through his 
employment. With child support payments, plaintiff has substantial income to meet her reasonable 
household expenses and should not be awarded any alimony. Nor should plaintiff be required to 
contribute to duplicative nanny/preschool/private school tuition expenses for the children without 
16 
discussion between the parties and agreement as to the shanng of any such expenses. The defendant 
contributed temporary attorney's fees to plaintiff Considering plaintiffs substantial income and equity 
distribution, she should be required to pay her own attorney's fees and costs and the Court should not 
credit the marital estate with unnecessary post-separation and post-support ordered debts incurred without 
the consent, knowledge nor agreement of defendant. 
4 / 
DATED this ^ day of February, 1996. 
DART. ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
T7 JOHN D. SHEAFFER, JR. / ' 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the C\ day of February, 1996, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Defendant's Submission re: Defendant's Proposed Property Distribution Set 
Forth in Defendant's Exhibit 25 was hand delivered to: 
Ellen Maycock, Esq. 
Pamela S. Nighswonger, Esq. 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C. 
50 West Broadway, Eighth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034 
mmh 
IRENE M. CLARK 
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Laura E. Starlev v. Steven D. McDowell 
Civil No. 944904672DA 
Proposed Distribution of Property* 
Description Equity Plaintiff Defendant 
Real Proyerty 
1754 Oakridge, SLC (Ex. D-25 "A") 
Defendant's Estimated Value $375,000 $375,000 
First Mortgage on Oakridge Property (154.749) (154,749) 
Equity $220,251 
Credit for downpayment 
from Premarital funds (20,126) 
42 Ontario/Chambers, PC (Ex. D-25) Premarital 
Appraised Value (Ex. P-2) 240,000 
Less Furniture (Ex. P-2) (10,000) 
Less First Mortgage (Ex. D-25B) (25.000) 
Equity 
4721 Sycamore, SLC (Ex. D-25 "C") 
Appraised Value (Ex. P-3) 
Less Mortgage 
Less Downpayment from 
premarital stock options 






1140 Park Avenue, PC (Ex. D-25 "D") Premarital 









1820 East Meadow, SLC (Ex. D-25 "E") 
Sales Proceeds 11/17/95 
Less Improvement Expenses 
Net Loss 
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Proposed Distribution of Property 
(Continue) 
Description Equity Plaintiff Defendant 
Notes Receivable 
Tom McDowell Note 4,000 4,000 
Baker Notes - Portion Remaining: 
71 N Main 
81 NMain 
67 E Second Avenue 
79 E Sixth Avenue 
79 E Sixth Avenue 
79 E Sixth Avenue 
79 E Sixth Avenue 
Old Towne Tavern 
79 E Sixth Avenue 
79 E Sixth Avenue 
79 E Sixth Avenue 12,300 12,300 
Blankenship (Uncollectable Judgment of $6,227) Vi Vi 
(Tax Liability) I (»/i) (Vi) 
Olson Note (Proceeds of $11,252 Used to Pay Off 
Marital Debt - $6,700 1994 State Taxes; 
$901 1994 Federal Taxes; $3,651 1994 Tax 
Preparation Fees) -0- -0-
Brian Jones Note: $10,049 Payoff Combined with 
Other Funds and Incorporated Into Notes Below: 
Marvin Jones 10,067 10,067 
Candi Lot 14,420 14,420 
Rodriguez 15,485 15,485 
Sargetis 2,200 2,200 
Ivison (Stokewater) 18,236 18,236 
Brown (Lasso Loop) 20,615 20,615 
3392 West 5700 South (Hardle) 5,962 5,962 
211 Wilmott (Exhibit "G") 
Judgments Received 17,076 
Less IRS Taxes Paid (12,000) 
Attorney's Fees (5,076) 
Net Received -0- ~0-













Stock (Ex. D-25 "H") 
Promissory Note 
Less First Mortgage 
Equity 
Pippas - $60,000; Steve's Premarital from 
Predecessor Pack and Troy Young Notes 
(See Ex. D-25 "I" attached) 
Edgeware/Chidaster - $20,872; Steve's Premarital 
(See Ex. D-25 "J" attached) 
Bank A ccounts 
Great Western Savings 
First Security Bank Savings (McDowell) 
First Security Bank (Paradyme Savings) 
First Security Bank (Foothill Properties) 
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Proposed Distribution of Property 
(Continue) 
Description Equity Plaintiff Defendant 
First Interstate Bank Savings (Starley) 44 44 
Nordstrom Credit Union (Starley) 50 50 
Investment Accounts 
Smith Barney #654-02720-17 (Laura) 7,367 
Children's Accounts - to be held for children's benefit — — 
West One IRA/Marital Portion $35,240 (Ex. D-8?5,240 35,240 
Woolrich Pension Plan/Marital Portion (Ex. D-8)15,583 15,583 
Nordstrom C.U. IRA (Premarital $6,885) 
Nordstrom Stock Option Plan 
@ $42.50/sh. (Ex. D-21) 33,111 33,111 
Nordstrom Profit Sharing Plan (P. S. Plus) 
Value Nordstrom Letter (11/13/95) 81,889 
Less Premarital Values 
per Statement 1/31/87 
Net Marital Equity 
Nordstrom P. S. Plus Account 
Personal Property and Miscellaneous 
1994 Toyota Camry 
1989 GMC Pickup Truck 
1986 Honda Accord LXI 
1990 Wells Cargo Utility Trailer 
i 
Furniture and Furnishings (Ex D-ll and D-12) 
Cottonwood Club Membership 
Jewelry 
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Proposed Distribution of Property 
{Continue) 
Description Equity Plaintiff Defendant 
Laura's Jewelry per State Farm List 
(Ex. D-13) + $800 Emeral Ring and 
$300 Gucci Watch 21,810 21,810 
Fur Coat - $6,000 Premarital — — 
Sailboat - Purchased with Proceeds Premarital Note--
Marital Liabilities 
(48,000) Credit for Assumption of Equity Line/Oakridgi 
E. P. Starley, M.D. 
Granite Furniture Company 
Providian Bank 
Nordstrom 
First Interstate Bank Visa 
American Express 
Trade Bott 
Estimated Taxes Owed for 1995: 














Total Values $431,205 $346,183 
Property Settlement from Laura to Steve to 
Equalize Values - to be Secured by Lien 
Against Oakndge Residence Until Plaintiff 
Sells, Changes her Primary Residence, Remarries, 
Cohabits or No Minor Children Live in the Home 
Whichever is First to Occur (42.5111 42.511 
NET DISTRIBUTION $388,694 $388,694 
•PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION ATTACHED TO HER SUBMISSION APPEARS TO 
MISCALCULATE HER TOTALS; THE ACCURATE TOTAL IN PLAINTIFF'S COLUMN IS $489,027 
INSTEAD OF $450,545 AND THE ACCURATE TOTAL IN DEFENDANT'S TOTAL IN 
DEFENDANT'S COLUM IS $677,783 INSTEAD OF $716,315 ON PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED 
DISTRIBUTION ATTACHMENT. 
0 0 0 2 5 3 
TabC 
Tttird Judicial District 
»^v 
NOV 1 41996 
War 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL (DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAURA E. STARLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN D. MCDOWELL, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 944904672 
The reserved issues of custody, visitation, alimony, child 
support property distribution, attorney's fees and associated 
financial issues were tried to the Court in a bench trial which 
took place November 16, 17 and December 28 and 29, 1995. At the 
conclusion of the trial, the Court requested that the parties 
submit written statements of their respective positions. Following 
the filing of the position statements, the case was submitted for 
decision on March 8, 1996. 
Witnesses were called, sworn and gave testimony. Exhibits 
were marked, offered and were received. The Court has considered 
the testimony and exhibits and has fully reviewed and considered 
the written submissions of the parties. After having reviewed all 
of the foregoing, the Court makes the following findings and 
reaches the following conclusions: 
STARLEY V. MCDOWELL i>AGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1. The parties were married in Salt Lake County, Utah, on 
May 9, 1987. 
2. At a hearing before the Court on January 30, 1995, the 
Court bifurcated the divorce and granted plaintiff a divorce from 
defendant, reserving all other issues. The Decree was entered 
thereon on February 14, 1995. 
3. Plaintiff is 41 years of age and is a merchandise manager 
for Nordstrom. As of October 31, 1995, she had year to date gross 
earnings of $46,221.19, or gross earnings of $4,622 per month. As 
an executive of Nordstrom, plaintiff receives stock options, which 
provides additional income opportunities. Realizable income from 
this source was not quantified in any meaningful way as it might 
relate to a given income year. In addition, should plaintiff 
contribute to the Nordstrom employee 401(k) plan, her employer 
matches her contributions to the extent of 20%. While plaintiff has 
had bonuses in past years, 1995 sales in her departments were down. 
Plaintiff anticipated no bonus in 1995. Based upon all of the 
evidence, the Court finds that for purposes of calculating child 
support, plaintiff's current adiusted gross income is $4,622 per 
month. 
STARLEY V. MCDOWELL PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
4. Defendant is 48 years of age, and is an investor. He 
invests in real estate, notes and contracts. His stock in trade is 
an inventory of parcels of real estate, notes and contracts. 
Just as the Court has been conservative in its approach to 
finding current income of plaintiff, it will likewise consider 
current income of defendant in the same way. Rather than determine 
plaintiff's income from a higher historical pattern, the Court used 
1995 actual earnings to date, yielding lower than usual income for 
plaintiff. I 
No meaningful accounting was available for defendant's 1995 
year to date income. Defendant estimated his 1995 income to be in 
the range of $70,000 to $98,000. In traditional business 
accounting, accounting for purchases and tracking the inventory of 
goods for the accounting period yields an accurate "cost of goods 
sold" number which is a significant and important business expense. 
Defendant's inventory is made up of parcels of real property, notes 
and contracts. No "cost of goods sold" analysis has been presented 
the Court for any tax period on defendant's investment business. 
Without such an analysis, it is difficult to determine defendant's 
income. 
William E. Page, Jr., a certified public accountant with over 
22 years of experience, evaluated defendant's investment income. 
STARLEY V. MCDOWELL PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
He was an internal revenue agent for some 15 years. He started 
doing accounting work and preparing tax returns for the parties in 
1987 and he has continued to do so through 1994. He had done no 
accounting work for the parties during 1995. He analyzed 
defendant's 1994 income and expenses and, based thereon, projected 
defendant's 1995 estimated annual income to be $76,081, or $6,340 
per month. While the Court is not entirely satisfied with the 
approach taken, it is nonetheless the best evidence of defendant's 
current income. As a self-employed individual, defendant is in a 
position to directly benefit through business expenses allowable 
for tax purposes such as entertainment and travel expenses. For 
that reason, the Court finds that for purposes of calculating child 
support defendant's current adjusted gross income is $80,000 or 
$6,667 per month. 
Although defendant's cash flow for a particular period may be 
significantly higher, the Court takes into account the necessity of 
plowing back into properties proceeds from the sales of properties. 
If defendant fails to do that in a skillful and well-managed way, 
the business he is in will soon fail. 
5. Two minor children have been born as issue of the 
marriage: Brittany Jane McDowell, born September 5, 1989, age 7; 
and, Megan Elizabeth McDowell, born June 16, 1992, age 4. 
STARLEY V. MCDOWELL PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
6. Plaintiff seeks the sole care, custody and control of the 
parties' minor children. Defendant does not dispute this issue. 
Plaintiff is and has been the primary caretaker of the children. 
The Court finds it to be in the best interest of said children to 
award their sole legal and physical custody to plaintiff. 
7. Defendant is awarded liberal and reasonable visitation 
with his daughters, consistent with the advisory guidelines set out 
in Section 30-3-33, Utah Code Ann., a copy of which should be 
attached and made a part by reference of the supplemental Decree. 
Should the parties be unable to successfully work out visitation 
II 
between themselves, the defendant shall have as minimum visitation 
rights those set forth in Section 30-3-35, Utah Code Ann., except 
visitation with Megan shall be the same as with Brittany and as is 
applicable to school-age children. A copy thereof shall be 
attached and made a part by reference of the supplemental Decree. 
8. Should plaintiff move more than 100 miles, she should 
give advance written notice of not less than 60 days of her intent 
to relocate, and shall advise defendant of her employment and 
residential addresses. 
I1 
9. Based upon the monthly combined adjusted gross income of 
$11,289, the Court finds the base combined child support obligation 
from the guideline tables to be $1,495. Plaintiff's proportionate 
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STARLEY V. MCDOWELL PAGE SIX MEMORANDUM DECISION 
share thereof is 41%, while defendants proportionate share thereof 
is 59%. Accordingly, defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff monthly 
child support of $882 until Brittany reaches the age of 18 or 
graduates from high school in the normal course, whichever last 
occurs. Thereafter, defendant shall pay child support for Megan 
consistent with the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines until 
Megan reaches the age of 18 or graduates from high school in the 
normal course, whichever last occurs. Support shall be paid in 
full by the 10th day of the current month. This support order 
shall be effective January 1, 1996. 
10. Defendant has sufficient resources to pay child support 
on a current basis. So long as defendant is current in the payment 
of his child support obligation, an automatic withhold and deliver 
order will not be required. However, should defendant become 
delinquent more than 3 0 days in his child support obligation an 
automatic withhold and deliver order may be implemented. 
11. While it would be nice to maintain the same standard of 
living after a divorce as enjoyed before, in the ordinary divorce 
that is not achievable. Two households will require greater 
resources to support than one. Both parties have and are enjoying 
favorable standards of living. Economic necessity may dictate some 
trimming from time to time. The children have enjoyed the luxury 
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of a nanny and attendance at private school, but the Court will not 
order those things as a reasonable court-mandated child support 
obligation. The Court will require the parties to share equally 
the expense of traditional day care expenses incurred by plaintiff 
in pursuing her employment* The Court will not require defendant 
to pay one-half of the cost of a private nanny. If the parties 
cannot agree between themselves as to what a traditional day care 
would foe, given their circumstances, then the issue may be returned 
to the Court for determination. 
Tine party incurring child care expense shall provide written 
verification of the cost atid identity of the child care provider to 
the other parent upon initial engagement of a provider and 
thereafter on the request of the other parent. The parent 
utilizing day care services shall notify the other parent of any 
change in day care services within 3 0 days. The day care 
provisions shall be effective January 1, 1996. 
12. If the parties agree on private schooling and 
supplemental nanny services, then they are to equally divide the 
cost thereof. 
13. Defendant should be given first consideration to provide 
day care services for the girls if doing so meets the needs and 
convenience of the parties. 
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14. The child support award shall be reduced by 50% for each 
child for periods of time during which the child or children are 
II 
with defendant for at least 25 of any 3 0 consecutive days. 
15. The parties shall maintain medical and dental coverage 
for the benefit of the minor children if it is available to them at 
reasonable cost. Both parents shall share equally the cost of the 
premiums actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of 
the insurance. The parties shall share equally all deductibles and 
all uninsured medical and dental expenses incurred for the minor 
children including, but not limited to, surgical fees and expenses, 
orthodontics, psychological and psychiatric care or any counseling 
or therapy, hospital expenses, physical therapy or any optical or 
eye care expenses. This provision shall be effective as of January 
1, 1996. 
16. So long as defendant has a continuing child support 
obligation, he shall provide for the benefit of the minor children 
insurance coverage on his life in a face amount of not less than 
$100,000, designating plaintiff as trustee for the children. Said 
life insurance coverage may be term insurance which will continue 
I 
in force until both daughters turn 18 or graduate from high school 
in the normal course, or they are otherwise emancipated. Upon 
emancipation of either daughter, the coverage may be reduced to 
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$50,000. Upon plaintiff's request, defendant shall produce 
evidence of such coverage within 10 days. Defendant shall secure 
such coverage within 60 days of the date of this Memorandum 
Decision. 
17. The parties shall exchange copies of their tax returns, 
with copies of all W-2's, 1099's, K~l's or any other required 
documentation of income, by July 1 of each year. The parties shall 
exchange 1995 returns within 3 0 days of the entry of the 
supplemental Findings, Conclusions and Decree herein. 
18. Defendant has the ability as a self-employed person to 
gain certain personal benefits from his income derived from self-
employment, which are treated as business expenses. In addition, 
the expenses that relate to his real property and depreciable 
property are deductible for tax purposes. Plaintiff does not have 
similar tax advantages. Therefore, the Court finds that it is 
reasonable for plaintiff to claim both children as personal 
exemptions for state and federal income tax purposes. 
19. Considering the large disparity in the assets awarded 
herein to the respective parties and the need of plaintiff to 
II 
adjust her circumstances, alimony in the amount of $1,000 per 
month, as ordered by this Court on January 30, 1995, is ordered 
continued through December 31, 1997. Said alimony shall terminate 
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on the death of plaintiff, upon her remarriage or cohabitation with 
a person of the opposite !pex, as defined by law. 
20. It is reasonable and appropriate that plaintiff pay and 
assume the following debts, holding defendant harmless therefrom: 
(approximate amounts) E.P. Starley, M.D., $5,000; Granite Furniture 
Company, $1,060; Providian Bank, $5,733; Nordstrom, $4,288; First 
Interstate Bank Visa, $5,117; American Express, $3,817; and, Trude 
Bott, $2,300, or a total of $27,315. Most, if not all, of these 
debts were incurred during the separation period of the parties. 
Under the "for better or worse" contract of the parties, the Court 
finds these debts to be marital debts. 
21. It is reasonable and appropriate that defendant pay and 
assume the following debts, holding defendant harmless therefrom: 
I (approximate amounts) equity line of credit against Oakridge 
property, $48,000; estimated quarterly taxes owed for 1995 — 
federal, $6,382, — state, $2,300, or a total of $56,682. The 
II 
parties agree that the equity line of credit is a marital debt and 
the Court so finds. It has been used principally to acquire notes 
receivable which are included in defendant's business inventory. 
II 
The tax obligations have been incurred as a result of defendant's 
self-employed business pursuits, and is also marital debt. 
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22. It is reasonable and appropriate that plaintiff be 
awarded the 1986 Honda Accord LXI of an agreed value of $3,400, 
free of any claims of defendant. 
23. It is reasonable and appropriate that defendant be 
awarded the 1994 Toyota Camry of an agreed value of $5,092; the 
1989 GMC pickup truck of an agreed value of $9,125; and, the 1990 
Wells Cargo utility trailer of an agreed value of $1,500, or a 
total value of these assets of $15,717. These assets are awarded 
subject to any debt thereon, which defendant is ordered to pay and 
hold plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
24. It is reasonable and appropriate that plaintiff be 
awarded the accounts with First Interstate Bank (savings) with a 
balance of approximately $44 and her Nordstrom Credit Union account 
with a balance of approximately $50, or a total of $94. 
25. It is reasonable and appropriate that defendant be 
awarded the accounts with Great Western Savings with a balance of 
approximately $71, the First Security Bank savings account with a 
balance of approximately $46, the First Security Bank savings 
(Paradyme) with a balance of approximately $450 and the account at 
First Security Bank (Foothill Properties) with a balance of 
approximately $108, or a total of $675. 
f\ A A O i ~ 
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26. It is reasonable and appropriate that plaintiff be 
awarded the furniture and furnishings in her possession at 1754 
Oakridge Drive, some of which was her premarital property, except 
as otherwise provided herein. It is reasonable and appropriate 
that defendant return plaintiff's fireplace tools, which are 
awarded plaintiff. Plaintiff should be, and is awarded the 
doghouse, cement pads and fencing relating thereto. The Court 
values said property at $17,000. Plaintiff is awarded her fur coat 
which was premarital property. Plaintiff is awarded the jewelry in 
her possession, except the diamond and sapphire ring. The Court 
values plaintiff's jewelry at $17,500. 
27. It is reasonable and appropriate that defendant be 
awarded the furniture and furnishings in his possession at 4721 
II 
Sycamore Drive, some of which was his premarital property, plus the 
additional items identified which are in plaintiff's possession. 
Defendant is awarded the two prints from the family room, the 
picture of the walking ducks from the kitchen, the two pictures of 
old English houses from the room off the kitchen, the glass sofa 
table and glass end table from the living room and approximately 
one-third of the knick-knacks from the master bedroom. The Court 
values said property at $15,500. Defendant should be awarded the 
diamond and sapphire ring of a value of $2,300. Defendant is 
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awarded his one-half interest in sailboat, which was his premarital 
property. 
28. The parties agree, and it is reasonable and appropriate 
that plaintiff be awarded the Cottonwood Club membership of a value 
of $5,950. Plaintiff shall be responsible for any club dues and 
obligations. 
29. Each party is awarded all of their own clothing and 
personal effects, while the children are awarded their own 
clothing, personal effects, toys and any other personal items. 
30. Both parties agree and it is reasonable and appropriate 
that plaintiff be awarded the Smith-Barney Inc. investment account 
with an agreed approximate value of $7,3 67. Plaintiff testified 
that the account was acquired with funds either from her 
'I inheritance or personal injury proceeds. Defendant disagrees, 
asserting there have been in and out transactions, though there is 
no dispute that the account has always been maintained in 
plaintiff's name. 
31. The parties agree and the Court finds it reasonable and 
appropriate to award the children's accounts to the children for 
their use and benefit. 
32. The parties agree and the Court finds it reasonable and 
appropriate to award defendant his West One Individual Retirement 
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account with the approximate value of $141,627. The Court finds 
the net marital value thereof to be approximately $35,240, with the 
premarital portion thereof to be worth approximately $106,3878. 
The parties agree and the Court finds it reasonable and appropriate 
to award defendant his Woolrich Pension Plan of the approximate 
value of $20,185. The Court finds the net marital value thereof to 
be approximately $15, 583.|| 
33. The parties agree and the Court finds it reasonable and 
appropriate to award plaintiff the Nordstrom Credit Union IRA of 
the approximate value of $6,885. Both parties agree that this was 
plaintiff's premarital property, and the Court so finds. The Court 
finds it is reasonable and appropriate to award plaintiff the 
Nordstrom Employee Stock Option Plan, which the Court finds to have 
a marital value of approximately $25,000. Defendant urged the 
stock options had a value of $33,111, based on a current trading 
price of $42.50. Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends the stock 
options had a value of $23,330, based on a current trading price of 
$39. The trading price near year end 1995 was $40-1/8, and neither 
party accounted for the costs of sale. The Court finds it is 
reasonable and appropriate to award plaintiff the Nordstrom P.S. 
Plus Account with a marital value of $45,930. The parties agreed 
on the value, and the Coui;t finds it is reasonable and appropriate 
r? ft (] °> \ Q 
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to award plaintiff the Nordstrom ProtIt shai Ing Plan with a marital 
value of approxi mate sJ y $ 7 0 0C 0 -c^ - ..... „ .,- hese assets - + 
$70,783 , while plali I tiff valued then, ui
 v ---,--'-- - • --- uctai ;;iant^ 
/ala<- of these assets is S , 4 . . \J l 5 . 
34. 
occupieu LIIC . • i iugt r. oj.nct .arties 
separated. Plaintiff values thn property at- $32^ . i. -• * 
based on nis knowledge of properL> values, i.ui positive rea. ts&tate 
market fro-" " •- r-r.-. of t-ho appraisal unt ' * r<- > **d 
asserted that the tirst mortgage on the homf. was $ 1 D 8 , .-4- *cf< 
3t tr.e nome near yea? end l^yt* to have been approximately $365,000, 
' i -*- v- ^ r,nv*"!"rfiri''v -^^  ] i n c c ""• *~ "**r^ r^ r *"*xi m a t " e ^  v ^ ' * ' ' -""*+ o^n 11 \' 
awarded plaintiff, subject to the nr^t mortgage there 
defendant narm]--r- **-i-*~-f efendanu sndii quic-cidim his 
interest therein to plaii itiff. 
35. Defendant has occupied the home . seated at 4'7;:i Sycamore 
A i i A ) « ,  i : 
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market value - Ci'--. , OGi efendant placed " ;- h e r e o n ~^ 
?" ""* . ' ~~ **u-?rc:on was *^  * -im-* ** * "f '^••:"7 ^~-
Lelendai,, liquidated premarital ,-.-__ .. .. 
jropert finds the reasonable value * < oquity 
t HP> . ~v-~uild be awarded defendant ~ 
property i s awarded the defendant, subject +*o i-hp d 
saving plaintiff harmless therefrom. Said nome .;- i A>\ * 
i lame. 
36. Defendant acquired thp property located at 42 Ontar io 
Canyon Street, Park City, f^i(s prif r to the marriage. The 
end of :5 * >, I '-* 9 5. The remaining balctn^e J U C . u ^. ^ i . t 
mortqaqe •»•*" " *m<~> * *vi . <=t ^xreedf.t ">>-. )(* ." • * * 
rema . 
$9b,(00. The secona mortgage proceeds wer> utilized -ttairnisq 
notes and real estate whir1, .-- • ' ' nvestment business 
operated „ . a*_i _ndant . The
 L 
be awarded to defendant, subject to the first ana second mortgaa-
Def°' »d« * --.-ia , .- piaint; " ** narmless therefrom,, 
j/. L^ efendaiiv. *cquire^ ^ property L-c^ 
Avenue, Park C.tv, tahf pi lor -he ir.arr:aqe of the part.es, 
]| ii ided said 
M •* U ' \\ \\ 
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property had a lair market . aiue of $.:4. Aitii -hich plaintiff 
agrees "^- *. a ] • , 
several adjustments to Wo.^* muL^ -i^ ^^ ^ c lecognue. ,:._I*L 
the adjustments, the real estate market dur; g the intervening y* 
v .- ^  is ' - •* defendant. 
Accordingly, trie Court finds the fair marK^i vaxUc a e r e c , t~ ° 
$225,000. The r.r-tnan^ thereon n ^ ^ - *-nc cr -9-
c * * 
awarded +* rlefendan: ^Lject to * \- mortgage tnetbon, ana saving 
plaintiff harmless therefrom 
3 8 . 
appropriate t award defendant the property *t 29b0 Adams Street 
Salt Lake C:"-* -rorort- r*-~ purchasec *~r C Q" 4 n0 a r^ h^d a 
mortgage thereoi . /»rr ^ n pmi .,_ . 
39. The parties agree and the Court ; m d s eascTianle ana 
ent-. * • •••:a:-a defendant the r r o r c ^ v **• ? 8 n n °-l.^ ir Pt^eet :i n 
Sal: c-ur^ w ^ L ^ - The agreed equity .. . . : I I:I : t: 
finds easonable and appropriate tc awarM defendant the property 
c ;n Lne pdities agree has 110 
vaiut. 
4i), Thn pnrt ins agree that the following assets have the 
1 n | '..JIIJI 111 in 11 II I In i n i l I in mi in i I in o a s u n . i h I i iiiiij u p p r o p r i i t e 
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to award defendant: * not*- \arltal ;alue* ; 
B 1 H i l t o r w - J i i I Il mi , | | , ~* ,:• * i n ? g 
note, ... .--,.. Candi Lot note, vl4,t^v.. . .,* ^ *^<. ; 
Sargetis note,. $2,20^: Ivison note, 518.. laritai val .• !-• 
r 
2 1 1 W i ± mo L t n o t e , ± _ I ^ e u l n u v ^ i lie , A i V e j u o l e ,
 v v i , -t o«. , J d i i l u i 
value); Washburn not* $?P '^P (marital vai,.^. • Overv rntp. ^47 Rri 
( ~ 
$2 ,9b i a r i t a i va*u* •• " < * i - ^ n a r i t a i " a i u e : ; 
S h e r r i c k n o t e , $ 1 8 , 6 0 0 (mar i t a 1 v a l u e $ 3 , 5 3 4) ; I I ;; I n o t e , $ 1 4 , 5 0 0 
(mar :ii 1: i ] < Ill i u ; $ 2 ; 5 5 ) ; IF ] : :i • • - ' $ I , 1 0 3 (• • ia:i :ii I : ., iJ < .] n .• .) ; S- .] • I: 
note, $10,029 (marital value); Eyre note, $:i 1 ,055 (marital value); 
and, Stock note, $91( 947 (marital value). The total value of these 
assets is $3 01 ,23 ; 
4,1 Plaintiff contends the Baker Notes have a marital value 
c^ - ,~ — .rfc~ ,
 en(is t|le marital value to be 
$ . . s*~ « -,na^  t^ vi'. c reasonable and appropriate to 
award the rema mirig \alue of $ I 2 , 030, after partial pa} me i l t i t: :: • 
c,i-: * !..,,. : . 
42. Defendant contends that a note in the face amount o* 
$60,000 dated July : • 199^ from William, h ippas i s a premarital 
asset . . 
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case was filed November -: Tro\ \ounq paid off the remaining 
ba;.ir "r 
Pippas note should lo awarded defendant. 
43. ^ • 
May " ,^oo J.^> aia^i;, oi rv enaant ^ utenas tie Christen^ 
(Chidaster) obligation was created ^r ,T * proceeds fro 
E-i •- -
thereon of i-<-t 782 snouia De awarded defendant. 
4 4 T In P *' o r e o o • ^  '"* - •- ' o ^ a s s ° t r*- i m •.- ~ <-- +- H r- -^  <•-* j^-^ g p v- ^  o >~ o ^  4 
b e . i it i mi ii
 L * i a war a . _ -. - . 
plaintiff ol $3/9,81 and to defendant of $8<*,'.»4« - ?he Difference 
in asset awards - ~ ^f^ *-v parties is $b±<±,±j>±. Detendant urc1: u 
appi: • : :i :imately $. assets into the marriage. He receiver ..n 
inheritance from his mother in 1989 of Su>5, K). Plaintiff lorou-. 
a number * premarital
 a s s e t s ± \r* -r \:^i- • e 
accounte-.- ...... but were not caref«A,: ^ec* . : ^ 
$33,f-J0 from her mother . November *. She received 
perr 
n O t . ai J. y 
45. Neither party maintained a separate accounting for their 
$ 
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and efforts of both parties have been involved in preserving and 
enhancing the over?:" •• -r. — " - "umstan"- ? -f - r. c.-.rt :e-. D U U I 
parties recognized marital components .,;,.-; ^iiueL vc^ 'v . n ™*n\/ 
of * • ' assets -\e division of assets *• rained herein generally 
trace; 
S i g n i l i ^ d u L p!^ i. ^ x w i ^ * u e l ^ n d d i i l ^ a S S f c L ^ 1 u d t w t l ' e i c a i C D U Q U C 
investments .: a rapidly apureciatma r>-.: > state market. It takes 
which aeienua udi i~ . - .s^c. .- . 
resul" . • recis* - i uvirion -ari^a. * - "< 
r . ^ 
personal and business-related characterise :s or m e assets. rrom 
f h e foreCTOinC* ^ '"""* n r i H n r - nr* c a s l t ' h o n v ^ T f i • ' i A n c H c* v* £j ~> >-i /""-% m •- a i *** , 
equitable. 
^ ^ »^-> inijir "*n " ° f*r * - ^-f +- Qinporar* ",^ "* ' ^  
sup, - -^- . - -*~-
December JI, 1'J94, p:ovided I or jne-hali • .* < -jests or m e nanny ana 
required the payment - <**-' per montn loi i*s Kamru- *-J—,<-•--~~ 
plaint^:. .^ «-..». , . . , ,.-, . co account ^ ... he s p e c i i ^ .:^:fc. 
place, the Court finds it appropriate to aw ard plaintiff Judgiru 
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for '"1,348.85 : cr arrearages : n -n i i a suppoi t alimony and day care 
"LIU ,' -r,-r-
.... .-wwx ixhJL '+- appropriate tr> award plaintiff 
. u . ; i, 14 < ,uh f or one-half children7 s medical 
] * ~*>. 
to, *,*
 JiC .aiijc uisparilv lie assets of the parties, 
as herein awarded, the Court finds -, r reasonable and appropriate * 
( r i 
plaintiff, :uaitiun . ne temporal v <!* i i>£ $1,500. 
*. - ^o* * r necessary documents ^J 
« f • * d . 
bo. Counsel for piamtitr srid ; . prepare and ~"1 ~t 
appropriate supplement" • ^ n c M y n^<r and Decree hereon, 
. _.,._ :i_. L, ; ,u 11""a I ds I ! I I  mi in. 
Dated this /2- day or Novembe. 
i^A^lh fsUjV^ u^ 
KENNETH RIGTRUP ^  
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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Attorney for Defei. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAURA E. STARLEY, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ; 
STEVEN D. MCDOWELL, ; 
Defendant. ] 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 94 490 4672 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial on November 16 and 17, and 
December 28 and 29, 1995. The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup presided. Plaintiff was present 
in person and represented by her counsel, Ellen Maycock, and defendant was present in person 
and represented by his counsel, John D. Sheaffer. The court heard testimony of witnesses and 
received exhibits. Following the trial, each party filed a position statement to assist the court 
with its decision. Based on the foregoing, good cause appearing, the court hereby makes the 
following: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Maniage. The parties were married on May 9, 1987, in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
2. Decree of Divorce. The decree of divorce in this matter was entered on 
February 14, 1995, reserving for trial the issues of custody, visitation, child support, alimony, 
property distribution, attorneys' fees, and other associated issues. 
3. Children. The parties have two minor children: Brittany Jane McDowell, born 
September 5, 1989, and Megan Elizabeth McDowell, born June 16, 1992. 
4. Custody and Visitation. The parties agreed and the court finds that it is in the 
children's best interests that plaintiff should be awarded sole care, custody, and control of the 
minor children. Defendant should be awarded liberal and reasonable visitation in accordance 
with the statutory guidelines set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-35, a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by this reference. Visitation with Megan 
should be the same as with Brittany and as applicable to school age children. In addition, the 
advisory guidelines set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-33, a copy of which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit B, should apply. I 
In the event plaintiff moves more than 100 miles from her present residence, she 
should give defendant not less than sixty days advance written notice of her intent to do so and 
should keep defendant advised of her employment and residential addresses. 
5. Employment and Income of Plaintiff. Plaintiff is 41 years old and is a 
merchandise manager for Nordstrom. As of October 31, 1995, her year-to-date gross income 
was $46,221.19, or $4,622 per month. As an executive of Nordstrom, plaintiff receives stock 
options which provide additional income opportunities. However, realizable income from this 
source is not quantified in any meaningful way as it might relate to a given income year. In 
addition, if plaintiff contributes to the Nordstrom employee 401(k) plan, her employer matches 
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her contribution to the extent of 20%. Although plaintiff has had bonuses in past years. 1995 
sales in her departments were down. She anticipated no bonus in 1995. Based on the foregoing, 
the court finds that for purposes of calculating child support, plaintiffs current adjusted gross 
income is $4,622 per month. 
6. Employment and Income of Defendant. Defendant is 48 years old and works as n 
investor. He invests in real estate, notes, and contracts. His stock-in-trade is an inventory of 
parcels of real estate, notes, and contracts. The court feels that it is appropriate to be 
conservative in finding current income of defendant, as it has been in finding plaintiffs current 
income. Accordingly, the court has used plaintiffs 1995 actual earnings, yielding lower than 
usual income for plaintiff. ' 
With respect to defendant's 1995 income, no meaningful accounting was 
available. Defendant estimated his 1995 income to be in the range of $70,000 to $98,000. In 
traditional business accounting, accounting for purchases and tracking inventory of goods for the 
accounting period yields an accurate cost of goods sold number, which is a significant and 
important business expense. Defendant's inventory is made up of parcels of real property, notes, 
and contracts. No costs of goods sold analysis has been presented to the court for any tax period 
on defendant's investment business. Without such an analysis, it is difficult to determine 
defendant's income. 
William Page, a certified public accountant with over twenty-five years 
experience, evaluated defendant's investment income. Mr. Page had done no accounting work 
for the parties during 1995. He analyzed defendant's 1994 income and expenses and based 
thereon, projected defendant's 1995 estimated annual income to be $76,081, or $6,340 per 
month. While the court is not entirely satisfied with the approach taken, it is nonetheless the best 
evidence of defendant's current income. As a self-employed individual, defendant is in a 
3 
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position to directly benefit through business expenses allowable for tax purposes, such as 
entertainment and travel expense. For that reason, the court finds that, for purposes of 
calculating child support, defendant's current adjusted gross income is $80,000 per year, or 
$6,667 per month. Although defendant's cash flow for a particular period may be significantly 
higher, the court has taken into account the necessity of plowing back in to the properties 
proceeds from the sale of properties. If defendant fails to do that in a skillful and well-managed 
way, the business he is in will soon fail. 
7. Child Support. Based on the monthly combined adjusted gross income of 
$11,289, the court finds that the base combined child support obligation from the guideline tables 
to be $1,495. Plaintiffs proportionate share thereof is 41%, while defendant's proportionate 
share thereof is 59%. Accordingly, defendant should be ordered to pay to plaintiff monthly child 
support of $882 until Brittany reaches the age of 18 or graduates from high school in the normal 
course, whichever last occurs. Thereafter, defendant should pay child support for Megan 
consistent with the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines until Megan reaches the age of 18 or 
graduates from high school in the normal course, whichever last occurs. Child support should be 
paid in full by the tenth day of the current month. This support order should be effective 
January 1, 1996. I 
8. Income Withholding. Defendant has sufficient resources to pay child support on a 
current basis. So long as defendant is current in the payment of his child support, an automatic 
withhold and deliver order should not be required. However, if defendant becomes delinquent 
more than thirty days in his child support obligation, an automatic withhold and deliver order 
may be implemented. 
9. Day Care and Private School Expenses. The court finds that the parties cannot 
maintain the same standard of living after the divorce as they enjoyed before because two 
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households require greater resources to support than one. The children have previously enjoyed 
the luxury of a nanny and attendance at private school, but the court will not order those things as 
a court-mandated child support obligation. The court will require the parties to share equally the 
expense of traditional day care expenses incurred by plaintiff in pursuing her employment; 
however, the court will not require defendant to pay one-half the cost of a private nanny. If the 
parties cannot agree between themselves as to what the cost of traditional day care would be 
given their circumstances, the issue may be returned to the court for determination. 
The party incurring child care expense should provide written verification of the 
cost and identity of the child care provider to the other parent upon initial engagement of a 
provider and thereafter at the request of the other parent. The parent utilizing day care services 
should notify the other parent of any change in day care services within thirty days. The day care 
provision should be effective January 1, 1996. 
If the parties agree upon private schooling and supplemental nanny services, they 
are to divide equally the cost thereof. 
Defendant should be given first opportunity to provide day care services for the 
children if doing so meets the needs and convenience of the parties. 
Child support should be reduced by 50% for periods of time during which the 
children are with defendant for twenty-five of any thirty consecutive days. 
10. Medical and Dental Insurance. The parties should maintain medical and dental 
insurance coverage for the benefit of the children if it is available to them at a reasonable cost. 
Both parties should share equally the cost of premiums actually paid by a parent for the 
children's portion of the insurance. The parties should share equally all deductibles and 
uninsured medical and dental expenses incurred for the parties' minor children, including, but 
not limited to, surgical fees and expenses, orthodontics, psychological and psychiatric care, any 
5 
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counseling or therapy, hospital expenses, physical therapy, or any optical or eye care expenses. 
This provision should be effective as of January 1, 1996. 
11. Life Insurance. So long as defendant has a continuing child support obligation, he 
should provide for the benefit of the minor children life insurance on his life with a death benefit 
of not less than $100,000, designating plaintiff, as trustee for the minor children, as beneficiary. 
The life insurance coverage may be term insurance which should be maintained until both 
children turn eighteen or graduate from high school in the normal course or are otherwise 
emancipated. On emancipation of either child, the coverage may be reduced to $50,000. 
Defendant should produce evidence of such coverage within ten days upon plaintiffs request. 
Defendant should secure such coverage within sixty days of the date of the memorandum 
decision dated November 12, 1996. 
12. Income Verification. The parties should exchange copies of their tax returns, with 
copies of all W-2s, 1099s, K-ls, or any other required documentation of income by July 1 of 
each year. The parties should exchange 1995 income tax returns within thirty days of the entry 
of the supplemental findings, conclusions, and decree herein. 
13. Tax Exemptions. Defendant has the ability as a self-employed person to gain 
certain personal benefits from his income derived from self-employment which are treated as 
business expenses. In addition, the expenses that relate to his real property and depreciable 
property are deductible for tax purposes. Plaintiff does not have similar tax advantages. 
Therefore, the court finds that it is reasonable for plaintiff to claim both children as personal 
exemptions for state and federal income tax purposes. 
14. Alimony. Given the large disparity in the assets awarded to the respective parties 
and the need of plaintiff to adjust her circumstances, alimony in the amount of $1,000 per month, 
as ordered by this court on January 30, 1995, should be ordered to be continued through 
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December 31, 1997. Alimony should terminate on the death of plaintiff, on her remarriage or 
cohabitation with a person of the opposite sex as determined by law. 
15. Distribution of Property and Debts. One of the primary issues in this case was 
whether certain assets of the parties were marital or premarital or traceable to premarital 
properties. Neither party maintained a separate accounting for their premarital assets and the 
disposition thereof. Separate monies and efforts of both parties have been involved in preserving 
and enhancing the overall financial circumstances of the parties. Both parties recognized marital 
components and values involved in many of the assets. The division of assets contained herein 
generally traces the assets to the party of origin. The court recognizes that a significant portion 
of defendant's assets were real estate investments in a rapidly appreciating real estate market. 
This division takes into account the parties' needs and perpetuates the investment business in 
which defendant earns his living. While the award of property does not result in a precisely 
equal division of the marital estate, it nonetheless reasonably recognizes premarital contributions 
and the personal and business related characteristics of the assets. The following award of assets, 
less the debts ordered to be paid by the respective parties, will yield a net award of assets to 
plaintiff of $379,811 and to defendant of $893,942. The difference in asset awards to the two 
parties is $514,131. Defendant brought approximately $450,000 in assets into the marriage. He 
received an inheritance from his mother in 1989 of $55,000. Plaintiff brought a number of 
premarital assets into the marriage which were accounted for, but were not carefully valued. She 
inherited $33,000 from her mother in November of 1989. She received a personal injury 
settlement of $30,000, the details of which were not fully disclosed. 
Based upon the foregoing and considering the provisions herein contained, the 
court finds the following distribution to be fair and equitable: 
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(a) Debts to Plaintiff. Plaintiff should assume, pay, and hold defendant 
harmless from the following debts (approximate amounts): 
E.P. Starley $ 5,000 
Granite Furniture Company 1,060 
Providian Bank 5,733 
Nordstrom 4,288 
First Interstate Bank Visa 5,117 
American Express 3,817 
Trude Bott 2.300 
Total $27,315 
Most, if not all, of these debts were incurred during the separation of the parties. 
Under the "for better or worse" contract of the parties, the court finds these debts to be 
marital. 
(b) Debts to Defendant. It is reasonable and appropriate that defendant should 
assume, pay, and hold plaintiff harmless from the following debts (approximate 
amounts): 
Equity line of credit against Oakridge property $ 48,000 
Estimated quarterly taxes owed for 1995: federal 6,382 
Estimated quarterly taxes owed for 1995: state 2.300 
Total $56,682 
The parties agreed that the equity line of credit was a marital debt and the court so 
finds. It had been used principally to acquire notes receivable which were included in 
defendant's business inventory. The tax obligations were incurred as a result of 
defendant's self-employed business pursuits and are also marital debt. 
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(c) Vehicles. Plaintiff should be awarded the 1986 Honda Accord with an 
agreed value of $3,400, free and clear of any claim of defendant. Defendant should be 
awarded the 1994 Toyota Camry with an agreed value of $5,092, the 1989 GMC pickup 
truck with a value of $9,125, the 1990 Wells Cargo utility trailer with a value of $1,500, 
for a total value of these assets of $15,717. Defendant should be ordered to assume, pay, 
and hold plaintiff harmless from any debts associated with these assets. 
(d) Bank Accounts. Plaintiff should be awarded her accounts with First 
Interstate Bank with a balance of $44 and Nordstrom Credit Union with a balance of $50, 
for a total of $94. Defendant should be awarded his accounts with Great Western Savings 
with a balance of $71, First Security Bank with a balance of $46, First Security Bank 
savings (Paradigm) with a balance of $450, and the account at First Security Bank, 
Foothill Properties, with a balance of $108, for a total of $675. 
(e) Furniture. Furnishings, and Personal Effects. Plaintiff should be awarded 
the furniture and furnishings in her possession at 1754 Oakridge Drive, some of which 
was her premarital property, except as otherwise provided herein. Defendant should 
return plaintiffs fireplace tools, which are awarded to plaintiff. Plaintiff should be 
awarded the doghouse, cement pads, and fencing relating thereto. The court values this 
property at $17,000. Plaintiff is awarded her fur coat which was premarital property, and 
her jewelry, except the sapphire and diamond ring. The court values plaintiff s jewelry at 
$17,500. Defendant should be awarded the furniture and furnishings in his possession at 
4721 Sycamore Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, some of which was his premarital property, 
plus additional items identified which are in plaintiffs possession. Defendant is awarded 
two prints from the family room, the picture of the walking ducks from the kitchen, the 
two pictures of old English houses from the room off the kitchen, the glass sofa and end 
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tables from the living room, and approximately one-third of the knickknacks in the 
master bedroom. The court values this property at $15,500. Defendant should also be 
awarded the diamond and sapphire ring with a value of $2,300. Defendant is also 
awarded his one-half interest in a sailboat which was his premarital property. 
(e) Cottonwood Club Membership. Plaintiff should be awarded the 
Cottonwood Club membership with a value of $5,950, and should pay and be responsible 
for any club dues and obligations. 
(f) Clothing and Personal Effects. Each party should be awarded his or her 
own clothing and personal effects, while the children are awarded their clothing, personal 
effects, toys, and other personal items. 
(g) Smith Barnev Investment Account. Plaintiff should be awarded the Smith 
Barney investment account in the amount of $7,367. Plaintiff testified that this account 
was acquired with funds from her inheritance or personal injury settlement. Defendant 
disagreed, although there is no dispute that this has been maintained in plaintiffs name. 
The court finds that this account is plaintiffs separate property. 
(h) Children's Accounts. The parties agreed and the court finds that it is 
reasonable and appropriate to award the children's accounts to the children for their use 
and benefit. 
(i) Defendant's Retirement Accounts. Defendant should be awarded his West 
One Individual Retirement Account with an approximate value of $141,627. The court 
finds that the marital value of that account is $35,240, with the premarital portion valued 
at approximately $106,387. Defendant should also be awarded his Woolrich Pension 
Plan with a value of $20.185. The net marital value of that plan is $15,583. 
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(j) Plaintiffs Retirement Accounts. Plaintiff should be awarded her 
Nordstrom Credit Union IRA of $6,885. The court finds that this account is plaintiffs 
premarital property. Plaintiff should also be awarded her Nordstrom Employee Stock 
option funds which the court finds to have a marital value of $25,000. Defendant 
asserted that the stock options had a value of $33,111, based on a current trading price for 
the stock of $42.50. Plaintiff contends that the stock options have a value of $23,330 
based on a current trading price of $39. The trading price near year end was $40.13 and 
neither party accounted for costs of sale. Plaintiff should also be awarded her Nordstrom 
P.S. Plus account with a marital value of $45,930, and her Nordstrom profit sharing plan 
with a marital value of approximately $70,000. Defendant valued this asset at $70,781, 
while plaintiff valued it at $69,556. The total marital value of these assets is $147,815. 
(k) Marital Residence. Plaintiff and the children have occupied the marital 
residence at 1754 East Oakridge Drive since the parties' separation. Plaintiff valued the 
property at $320,000 based on an April 1993 appraisal. Defendant valued the property at 
$375,000 based on his knowledge of property values, the positive real estate market from 
the time of the appraisal until the end of 1995, and improvements to the home following 
the appraisal. Plaintiff asserted that the first mortgage on the home was $158,348 based 
on her latest statement, while defendant claimed the balance was $156,070 on 
December 1, 1995. The court finds that the reasonable value of the home near year end 
of 1995 to be approximately $365,000, with a mortgage balance of approximately 
$157,000. The net equity therein of $208,000 should be awarded to plaintiff. The home 
is awarded to plaintiff subject to the first mortgage thereon, and plaintiff should hold 
defendant harmless therefrom. Defendant should execute a quit-claim deed conveying 
his interest to plaintiff. 
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(1) Sycamore Drive Property. Defendant has occupied a home located at 
4721 Sycamore Drive. It was appraised in mid-September of 1995 to have a fair market 
value of $196,000. Defendant placed a value thereon of $213,000. The mortgage on the 
property was in the amount of $147,874. Defendant liquidated premarital Woolrich stock 
to acquire the property. The court finds that the value of the equity in the home is 
$50,000, which should be awarded to defendant and the property should be awarded to 
defendant subject to the debt thereon, which defendant should be ordered to hold plaintiff 
harmless from. 
(m) 42 Ontario. Park City. Utah. Defendant acquired the property located at 
42 Ontario in Park City, Utah, in 1985, prior to the parties' marriage. The court finds that 
the value of the property is $240,000 as of the end of the year 1995. The remaining 
balance due on the first mortgage at the time of trial was just over $24,000, while the 
remaining balance due on the second mortgage was approximately $95,000. The second 
mortgage proceeds were utilized in obtaining notes and real estate which are a part of the 
investment business operated by defendant. The real property and the net equity therein 
of $121,000 should be awarded to defendant subject to the first and second mortgages, 
which defendant should pay and hold plaintiff harmless from. 
(n) 1140 Park Avenue. Park City. Utah. Defendant acquired the property 
located at 1140 Park Avenue, Park City, Utah, just prior to the marriage of the parties. 
An appraisal of the property as of October 1995, indicated that the property had a fair 
market value of $240,000. Defendant valued the property at $200,000 by making several 
adjustments to value. Although the court recognizes merit to the adjustments, the real 
estate market during the intervening year was rapidly appreciating, as testified to by 
defendant. Accordingly, the court finds the fair market value of the property to be 
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$225,000, the equity therein of $137,500 should be awarded to defendant subject to the 
mortgage thereon, which he should pay and hold plaintiff harmless from. 
(o) 2960 Adams Street. The parties agreed and the court finds it reasonable 
and appropriate to award to defendant the property at 2960 Adams Street, Salt Lake City. 
The property was purchased for $92,400 and had a mortgage thereon of $59,600, leaving 
equity therein of $32,800. 
(p) 2800 Blair Street. The parties agreed and the court finds it reasonable and 
appropriate to award to defendant the property at 2800 Blair Street, Salt Lake City, with 
an agreed equity therein of $ 19,271. 
(q) 1820 East Meadow. The court finds it reasonable and appropriate to 
award to defendant the property at 1820 East Meadow, Salt Lake City, which the parties 
agreed has no value. 
(r) Real Estate Notes. The parties agreed that the following assets have the 
following values, which the court finds reasonable and appropriate to award to defendant: 
Description Value 
Tom McDowell note (marital value) $ 4,000 
Blankenship note and judgment little or no value 
Marvin Jones note 10,067 
Candi Lot note 14,420 
Rodriguez note 15,485 
Sargetis note 2,200 
Ivison note (marital value) 18,236 
Brown note (marital value) 20,615 
Hardle note (marital value) 5,962 
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Alvey note (marital value) 
Washburn note (marital value) 
Overy note (marital value) 
Evans note (marital value) 
Daher note (marital value) 
Umana note (marital value) 
Sherrick note (marital value $3,534) 
Hoyt note (marital value $2,755) 
Flores note (marital value) 
Self note (marital value) 
Eyre note (marital value) 
Stock note (marital value) 
Total 














(s) Baker Notes. Plaintiff contends that the Baker Notes have a marital value 
of $38,532, while defendant contends that the marital value is $12,030. The court finds 
that it is reasonable and appropriate to award the remaining value of $12,030, after partial 
payment, to defendant. 
(t) Pippas Note. Defendant contends that a note in the face amount of 
$60,000, dated July 20, 1995, from William W. Pippas is a premarital asset. Plaintiff 
contends this asset to be marital. This divorce case was filed November 8, 1994. Troy 
Young paid off the remaining balance of his obligation on July 14, 1995, in the amount of 
$68,422.87, which was used to secure the Pippas note. The $60,000 Pippas note should 
be awarded to defendant. 
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(u) Chidaster Note. The parties disagree as to whether the Chidaster note of 
May 4, 1988, is marital or not. Defendant contends the Christensen (Chidaster) 
obligation was created from sale proceeds from the Edgeware property he held prior to 
the marriage. The amount due thereon of $20,782 should be awarded to defendant. 
16. Other Awards. On January 30, 1995, the court ordered temporary child support of 
$900 and temporary alimony of $1,000 per month. The order of December 21, 1994, provided 
for one-half of the cost of the nanny and required payment of $178 per month by defendant for 
Kids Kampus. Based on the foregoing, plaintiff should be awarded judgment in the amount of 
$1,348.85 representing child support arrearages, back alimony, and day care costs through 
October of 1995. In addition, plaintiff should be awarded judgment in the amount of $1,144.05 
representing one-half of the children's medical expenses and premiums through October of 1995, 
which defendant had failed to pay. 
17. Attorneys Fees. Plaintiff has incurred attorney's fees herein as of the initial days 
of trial in the amount of $15,436.75 and incurred additional fees for the additional two days of 
trial and in preparing the post trial submission. The court finds that these attorney's fees are 
reasonable and were necessarily incurred. Given the large disparity in the award of assets of the 
parties, the court finds that plaintiff has a need for assistance in payment of her fees, and 
defendant has the ability to pay a portion of plaintiffs attorney's fees. The court finds that 
defendant should be ordered to pay $15,000 as partial payment of plaintiff s attorney's fees and 
costs in addition to the temporary award of $1,500. 
18. Cooperation. Each party should be required to sign any necessary documents to 
effectuate the provisions hereof. 
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From the foregoing supplemental findings of fact, the court now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court has jurisdiction over the parties of this action and the subject matter of 
this action. 
2. The supplemental decree of divorce should conform to the foregoing findings of 
fact. -^ 
DATED this lH "day of /y^tyJfcv 1996. 
Approved as to form: 
JOHN D. SHEAFFER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following, postage prepaid, 
this && day of November, 1996: 
John D. Sheaffer, Esq. 
Dart. Adamson & Donovan 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 




30-3-35. Minimum schedule for v is i tat ion. 
(1) The visitation schedule snail apply to school-age children, ages 5-18, 
beginning with kindergarten. 
(2) If the parties do not agree to a visitation schedule, the following schedule 
shall be considerea the minimum visitation to which the noncustodial parent 
and the child shall be entitled: 
(a) one weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent or 
the court from 5:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m; 
(b) alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry 
of the decree from 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing each 
year; 
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation, and changes 
shall not be made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend 
visitation schedule: 
(d) if a holiday tails on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncusto-
dial parent shall be responsible for the child's attendance at school for that 
school day; 
(e) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the 
total holiday period extends beyond that time so that the child is free from 
school and the parent is free from work, the noncustodial parent shall be 
entitled to this lengthier holiday period; 
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is 
entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate 
beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial 
parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Human Rights Day beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iii) Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Sunday at 7 
p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which 
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled: 
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 
p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which 
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 
11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vi) Veterans Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; and 
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in 
Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 
1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday is equally divided; 
(g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is 
entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 
p.m.: at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other 
siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) New Years Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iii) President's Day neerinning at 6 p.m. the day before the holidav 
until 7 p.m. on the holidav; 
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(iv) July 4th beginning at 6 D.m. the day before the holiday until 11 
p.m. on the holiday; 
(v) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. 
unless the holiday extends for a iengthier period of time to which the 
noncustodial parent is completely entitled: 
(vi) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A. 
weekend beginning at 6 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m. 
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the 
noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vii) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(viii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until 
Sunday at 7 p.m; and 
(ix) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined 
in Subsection 30-3-32f3)(b) plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. 
until 9 p.m., so long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally 
divided; 
(h) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive father 
every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(i) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother 
every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(j) extended visitation with the noncustodial parent may be: 
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial 
parent; 
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial 
parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to visitation for the 
custodial parent consistent with these guidelines; 
(k) the custodial parent shall have an identical two week period of 
uninterrupted time during the children's summer vacation from school for 
purposes of vacation; 
(1) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's 
extended visitation shall be ¥2 of the vacation time for year-round school 
breaks, provided the custodial parent has holiday and phone visits: 
(m) notification of extended visitation or vacation weeks with the child 
shall be provided at least 30 days in advance to the other parent; and 
(n) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-35, enacted by L. became effective on Mav 3. 1993, pursuant to 
IMS, ch. 131, 5 5. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Law* L993, ch. 131 
EXHIBIT 
30-3-33. A d v i s o r y g u i d e l i n e s . 
In addition to the visitation schedule provided in Section 30-3-35, advisory 
guidelines are suggested to govern ail visitation arrangements between 
parents. These advisory guidelines include: 
(1) visitation schedules mutually agreed upon oy both parents are 
preferable to a court-imposed solution: 
(2) the visitation scneduie shall be utilized to maximize the continuity 
and stability of the child's life; 
(3) the court may alter this schedule to make shorter visits of greater 
frequency or other arrangements consistent with the child's best interests 
for children under age 5; otherwise the visitation schedule as provided in 
Section 30-3-35 shall apply; 
(4) special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the child 
available to attend family functions including funerais, weddings, family 
reunions, religious holidays, important ceremonies, and other significant 
events in the life of the child or m the life of either parent which may 
inadvertently conflict with the visitation schedule: 
(5) the noncustodial parent shall pick up the child at the times specified 
and return the child at the times specified, and the child's regular school 
hours snail not be interrupted: 
(6) the custodial parent shall have the child ready for visitation at the 
time he is to be picked up and shall be present at the custodial home or 
shall make reasonable alternate arrangements to receive the child at the 
time he is returned; 
(7) the court may make alterations in the visitation schedule to reason-
ably accommodate the work schedule of both parents and may increase the 
visitation allowed to the noncustodial parent but shall not diminish the 
standardized visitation provided in Section 30-3-35; 
(8) the court may make alterations in the visitation schedule to reason-
ably accommodate the distance between the parties and the expense of 
exercising visitation; 
(9) neither visitation nor child support is to be withheld due to either 
parents failure to comply with a court-ordered visitation schedule; 
(10) the custodial parent shall notify the noncustodial parent within 24 
hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social, sports, and 
community functions in which the child is participating or being nonored, 
and the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to attend and participate 
fully; 
(11) the noncustodial parent shall have access directly to all school 
reports including preschool and daycare reports and medical records and 
shall be notified immediately by the custodial parent in the event of a 
medical emergency; 
(12) each parent shall provide the otner with his current address and 
telephone number within 24 hours of any change; 
(13) each parent shall permit and encourage liberal telephone contact 
during reasonable hours and uncensored maii privileges with the child; 
(14) parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than 
surrogate care and the court shall encourage the parties to cooperate m 
allowing the noncustodial parent, if willing and able, to provide child care: 
(15) each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers with the 
name, current address, and telephone number of the other parent and 
shall provide the noncustodial parent with the name, current address, and 
telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the court for good 
cause orders otherwise: and 
(16) each parent shall be entitled to an equai division of major religious 
holidavs celebrated by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a 
religious holiday that the other parent does not celebrate shall have the 
right to be together with the cmid on the reiuhous holidav. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAURA E. STARLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN D. MCDOWELL, 
Defendant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
3<2 / 23*73 
Civil No. 94 490 4672 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for trial on November 16 and 17, and 
December 28 and 29, 1995. The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup presided. Plaintiff was present 
in person and represented by her counsel, Ellen Maycock, and defendant was present in person 
and represented by his counsel, John D. Sheaffer. The court heard testimony of witnesses and 
received exhibits. Following the trial, each party filed a position statement to assist the court 
with its decision. Based on the foregoing, and the court having made and entered its findings 
of fact and conclusions of law. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 
DECREED as follows: 
1. Custody and Visitation. Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody, and control of the 
parties' minor children: Brittany Jane McDowell, born September 5, 1989, and Megan Elizabeth 
McDowell, born June 16, 1992. Defendant is awarded liberal and reasonable visitation in 
accordance with the statutory guidelines set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-35, a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by this reference. Visitation with 
Megan shall be the same as with Brittany and as applicable to school age children. In addition, 
the advisory guidelines set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-33, a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit B, shall apply. 
In the event plaintiff moves more than 100 miles from her present residence, she 
is ordered to give defendant not less than sixty days advance written notice of her intent to do so 
and shall keep defendant advised of her employment and residential addresses. 
2. Child Support. Based on plaintiffs monthly income of $4,622 and defendant's 
monthly income of $6,667, defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff child support of $882 per 
month until Brittany reaches the age of 18 or graduates from high school in the normal course, 
whichever last occurs. Thereafter, defendant is ordered to pay child support for Megan 
consistent with the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines until Megan reaches the age of 18 or 
graduates from high school in the normal course, whichever last occurs. Defendant is ordered to 
pay child support in full by the tenth day of the current month. This support order is effective 
January 1, 1996. 
3. Income Withholding. So long as defendant is current in the payment of his child 
support, an automatic withhold and deliver order shall not be required. However, if defendant 
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becomes delinquent more than thirty days in his child support obligation, an automatic withhold 
and deliver order may be implemented. 
4. Dav Care and Private School Expenses. Plaintiff and defendant are ordered to 
share equally the expense of traditional day care expenses incurred by plaintiff in pursuing her 
employment. If the parties cannot agree between themselves as to what the cost of traditional 
day care would be given their circumstances, the issue may be returned to the court for 
determination. 
The party incurring child care expense shall provide written verification of the 
cost and identity of the child care provider to the other parent upon initial engagement of a 
provider and thereafter at the request of the other parent. The parent utilizing day care services is 
ordered to notify the other parent of any change in day care services within thirty days. The day 
care provision is effective January 1, 1996. 
If the parties agree upon private schooling and supplemental nanny services, they 
are ordered to divide equally the cost thereof. 
Defendant shall be given first opportunity to provide day care services for the 
children if doing so meets the needs and convenience of the parties. 
Child support shall be reduced by 50% for periods of time during which the 
children are with defendant for twenty-five of any thirty consecutive days. 
5. Medical and Dental Insurance. The parties are ordered to maintain medical and 
dental insurance coverage for the benefit of the children if it is available to them at a reasonable 
cost. Both parties are ordered to share equally the cost of premiums actually paid by a parent for 
the children's portion of the insurance. The parties are ordered to share equally all deductibles 
and uninsured medical and dental expenses incurred for the parties' minor children, including, 
but not limited to, surgical fees and expenses, orthodontics, psychological and psychiatric care. 
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any counseling or therapy, hospital expenses, physical therapy, or any optical or eye care 
expenses. This provision is effective as of January 1, 1996. 
6. Life Insurance. So long as defendant has a continuing child support obligation, he 
is ordered to provide for the benefit of the minor children life insurance on his life with a death 
benefit of not less than $100,000, designating plaintiff, as trustee for the minor children, as 
beneficiary. The life insurance coverage may be term insurance which shall be maintained until 
both children turn eighteen or graduate from high school in the normal course or are otherwise 
emancipated. On emancipation of either child, the coverage may be reduced to $50,000. 
Defendant is ordered to produce evidence of such coverage within ten days upon plaintiffs 
request. Defendant is ordered to secure such coverage within sixty days of the date of the 
memorandum decision dated November 12, 1996, or January 11, 1997. 
7. Income Verification. The parties are ordered to exchange copies of their tax 
returns, with copies of all W-2s, 1099s, K-ls, or any other required documentation of income by 
July 1 of each year. The parties are ordered to exchange 1995 income tax returns within thirty 
days of the entry of the supplemental decree of divorce herein. 
8. Tax Exemptions. Plaintiff is entitled to claim both children as personal 
exemptions for state and federal income tax purposes. 
9. Alimony. Defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff alimony in the amount of 
$1,000 per month, as ordered by this court on January 30, 1995, through December 31, 1997. 
Alimony shall terminate on the death of plaintiff, on her remarriage, or cohabitation with a 
person of the opposite sex as determined by law. 
10. Distribution of Property and Debts. The property and debts of the parties are 
awarded as follows: 
4 
A A n ^ H I A 
(a) Debts to Plaintiff. Plaintiff is ordered to assume, pay, and hold defendant 
harmless from the following debts (approximate amounts): 
E.P. Starley $ 5,000 
Granite Furniture Company 1,060 
Providian Bank 5,733 
Nordstrom 4,288 
First Interstate Bank Visa 5,117 
American Express 3,817 
Trude Bott 2.300 
Total $27,315 
(b) Debts to Defendant. Defendant is ordered to assume, pay, and hold 
plaintiff harmless from the following debts (approximate amounts): 
Equity line of credit against Oakridge property $ 48,000 
Estimated quarterly taxes owed for 1995: federal 6,382 
Estimated quarterly taxes owed for 1995: state 2300 
Total $56,682 
(c) Vehicles. Plaintiff is awarded the 1986 Honda Accord with an agreed 
value of $3,400, free and clear of any claim of defendant. Defendant is awarded the 1994 
Toyota Camry with an agreed value of $5,092, the 1989 GMC pickup truck with a value 
of $9,125, the 1990 Wells Cargo utility trailer with a value of $1,500, for a total value of 
these assets of $15,717. Defendant is ordered to assume, pay, and hold plaintiff harmless 
from any debts associated with these assets. 
(d) Bank Accounts. Plaintiff is awarded her accounts with First Interstate 
Bank with a balance of $44 and Nordstrom Credit Union with a balance of $50, for a total 
5 
0 0 0 1 9 ! 
of $94. Defendant is awarded his accounts with Great Western Savings with a balance of 
$71, First Security Bank with a balance of $46, First Security Bank savings (Paradigm) 
with a balance of $450, and the account at First Security Bank, Foothill Properties, with a 
balance of $108, for a total of $675. 
(e) Furniture. Furnishings, and Personal Effects. Plaintiff is awarded the 
furniture and furnishings in her possession at 1754 Oakridge Drive, some of which was 
her premarital property, except as otherwise provided herein. Defendant is ordered to 
return plaintiffs fireplace tools, which are awarded to plaintiff. Plaintiff is awarded the 
doghouse, cement pads, and fencing relating thereto, valued at $17,000. Plaintiff is 
awarded her fur coat which was premarital property, and her jewelry, except the sapphire 
and diamond ring, valued at $17,500. Defendant is awarded the furniture and furnishings 
in his possession at 4721 Sycamore Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, some of which was his 
premarital property, plus additional items identified which are in plaintiffs possession. 
Defendant is awarded two prints from the family room, the picture of the walking ducks 
from the kitchen, the two pictures of old English houses from the room off the kitchen, 
the glass sofa and end tables from the living room, and approximately one-third of the 
knickknacks in the master bedroom, valued at $15,500. Defendant also is awarded the 
diamond and sapphire ring with a value of $2,300. Defendant is also awarded his one-
half interest in a sailboat which was his premarital property. 
(e) Cottonwood Club Membership. Plaintiff is awarded the Cottonwood Club 
membership with a value of $5,950, and is ordered to pay and be responsible for any club 
dues and obligations. 
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(f) Clothing and Personal Effects, Each party is awarded his or her own 
clothing and personal effects, while the children are awarded their clothing, personal 
effects, toys, and other personal items. 
(g) Smith Barney Investment Account. Plaintiff is awarded the Smith Barney 
investment account in the amount of $7,367 as her separate property. 
(h) Children's Accounts. The children's accounts shall be maintained for the 
children for their use and benefit. 
(i) Defendant's Retirement Accounts. Defendant is awarded his West One 
Individual Retirement Account with an approximate value of $141,627 and his Woolrich 
Pension Plan with a value of $20,185. 
(j) Plaintiffs Retirement Accounts. Plaintiff is awarded her Nordstrom 
Credit Union IRA of $6,885. Plaintiff also is awarded her Nordstrom Employee Stock 
option funds with a marital value of $25,000. Plaintiff also is awarded her Nordstrom 
P.S. Plus account with a marital value of $45,930, and her Nordstrom profit sharing plan 
with a marital value of approximately $70,000, for total marital value of these assets of 
$147,815. 
(k) Marital Residence. Plaintiff is awarded the marital residence located at 
1754 East Oakridge Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to the first mortgage thereon, 
which plaintiff is ordered to pay and hold defendant harmless therefrom. Defendant is 
ordered to execute a quit-claim deed conveying his interest to plaintiff. 
(1) Sycamore Drive Property. Defendant is awarded the home located at 4721 
Sycamore Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to the debt thereon, which defendant is 
ordered to pay and hold plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
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(m) 42 Ontario. Park City. Utah. Defendant is awarded the property located at 
42 Ontario in Park City, Utah, subject to the first and second mortgages, which defendant 
is ordered to pay and hold plaintiff harmless therefrom. . 
(n) 1140 Park Avenue. Park City. Utah. Defendant is awarded the property 
located at 1140 Park Avenue, Park City, Utah, subject to the mortgage thereon, which 
defendant is ordered to pay and hold plaintiff harmless therefrom. | 
(o) 2960 Adams Street. Defendant is awarded the property at 2960 Adams 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
(p) 2800 Blair Street. Defendant is awarded the property at 2800 Blair Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
(q) 1820 East Meadow. Defendant is awarded the property at 1820 East 
Meadow, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
(r) Real Estate Notes. The following assets are awarded to defendant: 
Description Value 
Tom McDowell note (marital value) $ 4,000 
Blankenship note and judgment little or no value 
Marvin Jones note 10,067 
Candi Lot note 14,420 
Rodriguez note 15,485 
Sargetis note 2,200 
Ivison note (marital value) 18,236 
Brown note (marital value) 20,615 
Hardle note (marital value) 5,962 
211 Wilmott note little or no value 
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Alvey note (marital value) 
Washburn note (marital value) 
Overy note (marital value) 
Evans note (marital value) 
Daher note (marital value) 
Umana note (marital value) 
Sherrick note (marital value $3,534) 
Hoyt note (marital value $2,755) 
Flores note (marital value) 
Self note (marital value) 
Eyre note (marital value) 















(s) Baker Notes. Defendant is awarded the remaining value of $12,030 of the 
Baker Notes, after partial payment. 
(t) Pippas Note. The $60,000 Pippas note is awarded to defendant. 
(u) Chidaster Note. The Chidaster note of $20,782 is awarded to defendant. 
11. Other Awards. Plaintiff is awarded judgment in the amount of $1,348.85 
representing child support arrearages, back alimony, and day care costs through October of 1995. 
In addition, plaintiff is awarded judgment in the amount of $1,144.05 representing one-half of 
the children's medical expenses and premiums through October of 1995. 
12. Attorney's Fees. Defendant is ordered to pay $15,000 as partial payment of 
plaintiffs attorney's fees and costs in addition to the temporary award of $1,500. 
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13. Cooperation. Each party is ordered to sign any necessary documents to effectuate 
the provisions hereof. —j* 
DATED this 
up 
?/Tday of At* 
Approved as to form: 
1996. 





JOHN D. SHEAFFER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL 
DECREE OF DIVORCE to the following, postage prepaid, this lO day of November, 1996: 
John D. Sheaffer, Esq. 
Dart, Adamson & Donovan 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
-XLJIJK SViUJl &±J 
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EXHIBIT k 
DIVORCE 30-3-35 
30-3-35. Minimum schedule for v is i tat ion. 
(1) The visitation schedule shall apply to school-age children, ages 5-18, 
beginning with kindergarten. 
(2) If the parties do not agree to a visitation schedule, the following schedule 
shall be considered the minimum visitation to which the noncustodial parent 
and the child shall be entitled: 
(a) one weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent or 
the court from 5:30 p.m. unul 8:30 p.m; 
(b) alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry 
of the decree from 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing each 
year; 
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation, and changes 
shall not be made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend 
visitation schedule; 
(d) if a holiday tails on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncusto-
dial parent shall be responsible for the child's attendance at school for that 
school day; 
(e) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the 
total holiday period extends beyond that time so that the child is free from 
school and the parent is free from work, the noncustodial parent shall be 
entitled to this lengthier holiday period; 
( 0 in years ending m an odd number, the noncustodial parent is 
entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate 
beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial 
parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Human Rights Day beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iii) Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Sunday at 7 
p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which 
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled: 
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 
p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which 
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 
11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vi) Veterans Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; and 
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in 
Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 
1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday is equally divided; 
(g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is 
entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 
p.m.: at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other 
siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) New Years Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holidav 
until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iii) Presidents Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holidav 
until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
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(iv) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before tne holiday until 11 
p.m. on the holidav; 
(v) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. 
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the 
noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vi) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A. 
weekend beginning at 6 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m. 
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the 
noncustodial parent is completely entitled: 
(vii) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(viii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until 
Sunday at 7 p.m; and 
(ix) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined 
in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. 
until 9 p.m., so long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally 
divided; 
(h) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive father 
every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(i) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother 
every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(j) extended visitation with the noncustodial parent may be: I 
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial 
parent; 
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial 
parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to visitation for the 
custodial parent consistent with these guidelines; 
(k) the custodial parent shall have an identical two week period of 
uninterrupted time during the children's summer vacation from school for 
purposes of vacation; 
(1) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's 
extended visitation shall be V2 of the vacation time for year-round school 
breaks, provided the custodial parent has holiday and phone visits: 
(m) notification of extended visitation or vacation weeks with the child 
shall be provided at least 30 days in advance to the other parent: and 
(n) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-35, enacted by L. became effective on May 3. 1993. pursuant tc 
1998, ch. 131, fi 5. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Lawi 1993. ch. 131 
EXHIBIT 
30-3-33. Advisory guidelines. 
In addition to the visitation schedule provided in Section 30-3-35, advisory 
guidelines are suggested to govern all visitation arrangements between 
parents. These advisory guidelines include: 
(1) visitation schedules mutually agreed upon by both parents are 
preferable to a court-imposed solution: 
(2) the visitation schedule shall be utilized to maximize the continuity 
and stability of the child's life; 
(3) the court may alter this schedule to make shorter visits of greater 
frequency or other arrangements consistent with the child's best interests 
for children under age 5; otherwise the visitation schedule as provided in 
Section 30-3-35 shall apply; 
(4) special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the child 
available to attend family functions including funerals, weddings, family 
reunions, religious holidays, important ceremonies, and other significant 
events in the life of the child or in the life of either parent which may 
inadvertently conflict with the visitation schedule: 
(5) the noncustodial parent shall pick up the child at the times specified 
and return the child at the times specified, and the child's regular school 
hours shall not be interrupted: 
(6) the custodial parent shall have the child ready for visitation at the 
time he is to be picked up and shall be present at the custodial home or 
shall make reasonable alternate arrangements to receive the child at the 
time he is returned; 
(7) the court may make alterations in the visitation schedule to reason-
ably accommodate the work schedule of both parents and may increase the 
visitation allowed to the noncustodial parent but shall not diminish the 
standardized visitation provided in Section 30-3-35; 
(8) the court may make alterations in the visitation schedule to reason-
ably accommodate the distance between the parties and the expense of 
exercising visitation; 
(9) neither visitation nor child support is to be withheld due to either 
parent's failure to comply with a court-ordered visitation schedule; 
(10) the custodial parent shall notify the noncustodial parent within 24 
hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social, sports, and 
community functions in which the child is participating or being1 honored, 
and the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to attend and participate 
fully; 
(11) the noncustodial parent shall have access directly to all school 
reports including preschool and daycare reports and medical records and 
shall be notified immediately by the custodial parent in the event of a 
medical emergency; 
(12) each parent shall provide the other with his current address and 
telephone number within 24 hours of any change; 
(13) each parent shall permit and encourage liberal telephone contact 
during reasonable hours and uncensored mail privileges with the child: 
(14) parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than 
surrogate care and the court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in 
allowing the noncustodial parent, if willing and able, to provide child care: 
(15) each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers with the 
name, current address, and telephone number of the other parent and 
shall provide the noncustodial parent with the name, current address, and 
telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the court for good 
cause orders otherwise: and 
(16) each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major reiigious 
holidavs celebrated by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a 
reiigious holiday that the other parent does not celebrate shall have the 
right to be together with the child on the renmous holiday. 
History? C. 1953. 30-3-33. *«-—-* i... » 
